Pertanika Journal of Social Science & Humanities by Universiti Putra Malaysia Press,
ISSN: 0128-7702
P e r t a n i k a J o u r n a l o f
social
science
Humanities
VOLUME 8 NO.2
SEPTEMBER 2000
(Special Issue: Selected Papers from Faculty of
Economics & Management Seminar 2000)
A scientific journal published by Universiti Putra Malaysia Press
Pertanika Journal of Social Science and Humanities
I About the Journal
Pertanika, the pioneer journal of UPM, began
publication in 1978. Since then, it has established itself
as one of the leading multidisciplinary journals in the
tropics. In 1992, a decision was made to streamline
Pertanika into three journals to meet the need for
specialised journals in areas of study aligned with the
strengths of the university. These are (i) Pertanika
Journal of Tropical Agricultural Science (ii) Pertanika
Journal of Science & Technology (iii) Pertanika Journal
of Social Science & Humanities.
Aims and Scope
Pertanika Journal of Social Science and Humanities aims
to develop as a flagship journal for the Social Sciences
with a focus on emerging issues pertaining to the social
and behavioral sciences as well as the humanities,
particularly in the Asia Pacific region. It is published
twice a year in March and September.
The objective of the journal is to promote advancements
in the fields of anthropology, business studies,
communications, economics, education, extension
studies, psychology, sociology and the humanities.
Previously unpublished original, theoretical or empirical
papers, analytical reviews, book reviews and readers critical
reactions may be submitted for consideration. Articles
may be in English or Bahasa Melayu.
I Submission of Manuscript
Three complete clear copies of the manuscript are to be
submitted to
The Chief Editor
Pertanika Journal of Social Science and Humanities
Universiti Putra Malaysia
43400 UPM, Serdang, Selangor Darul Ehsan
MALARIA
Tel: 03-89468854 Fax:03-89416172
I Proofs and Offprints
Page proofs, illustration proofs and the copy-edited
manuscript will be sent to the author. Proofs must be
checked very carefully within the specified time as they
will not be proofread by the Press editors.
Authors will receive 20 offprints of each article and a copy
of the journal. Additional copies can be ordered from
the Secretary of the Editorial Board.
1 EDITORIAL BOARD~
Prof. Dr. Abdul Rahman Md Aroff - Chief Editor
Faculty of Human Ecology
Prof. Dr. Annuar Md. Nasir
Faculty of Economics & Management
Prof. Dr. Mohd. Ghazali Mohayidin
Faculty of Economics & Management
Prof. Dr. Hjh. Aminah Hj. Ahmad
Faculty of Education
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Rozumah Baharudin
Faculty of Human Ecology
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Abdul Halin Hamid
Faculty of Human Ecology
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Rosli Talif
Faculty of Modern Language Studies
Sumangala Pillai - Secretary
Universiti Putra Malaysia Press
INTERNATIONAL PANEL MEMBERS J
Published by Universiti Putra Malaysia Press
ISSN No.: 0128-7702
Prof. Jean Louis Floriot
International Graduate Institute of Agribusiness
Prof. Bina Agarwal
University Enclave India
Prof. V.T King
University of Hull
Prof. Royal D. Colle
Cornell University, Ithaca
Prof. Dr. LindaJ. Nelson
Michigan State University
Prof. Dr. Yoshiro Hatano
Tokyo Gakugei University
Prof. Max Langham
University of Florida
Prof. Mohamed Ariff
Monash University Australia
Prof. Fred Luthans
University of Nebraska
Prof. D.H. Richie
University of Toledo
Prof. Gavin W. Jones
Australian National University
Prof. Dr. Lehman B. Flecther
Ioxva State University
Prof. Ranee PL Lee
Chinese University, Hong Kong
Prof. Stephen H.K. Yeh
University ofHaxuaii at Manoa
Prof. Graham W. Thurgood
California State University
PERTANIKA EDITORIAL OFFICE
Research Management Centre (RMC)
1st Tloor, IDEA Tower II
UPM-MTDC, Technology Centre
Universiti Putra Malaysia
43400 Serdang, Selangor, Malaysia
Tel: +603 8947 1622, 8947 1619, 8947 1616
Pertanika Journal of Social Science & Humanities
Volume 8 Number 2 (September) 2000
Contents
Simple-sum Versus Divisia Monetary Aggregates for Malaysia: 59
Cointegration, Error-Correction Model and Exogeneity - Muzafar
Shah Habibullah, M. Azali & Ahmad Zubaidi Baharumshah
Exchange Rate and the Demand for Money in Malaysia - M. Azali, 71
Ahmad Zubaidi Baharumshah & Muzafar Shah Habibullah
Auditor Switch Decision of Malaysian Listed Firms: Tests of Determinants 77
and Wealth Effect - Huson Joher*, M Ali, Shamsher M., Annuar
MM & M. Ariff
Alignment of Management Control System to Corporate Competitive 91
Orientation: Some Empirical Evidence in Malaysia -Foong Soon Yau
Unit Trust Performance Measurement: the Snail Trail Approach - Tan 103
Yen Keng
Price Efficiency of Stock Index Futures Contracts: Are There Any 115
Arbitrage Opportunities? - Shamsher Mohamad & Taufiq Hassan
Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 8(2): 59 - 69 (2000) ISSN: 0128-7702
© Universiti Putra Malaysia Press
Simple-sum Versus Divisia Monetary Aggregates for Malaysia: Cointegration,
Error-Correction Model and Exogeneity
MUZAFAR SHAH HABIBULLAH, M. AZALI &
AHMAD ZUBAIDI BAHARUMSHAH
Department of Economics
Faculty of Economics and Management
Universiti Putra Malaysia,
43400 UPM, Serdang, Selangor,
Malaysia
Keywords: Divising money aggregates, cointegration, error correction model, exogeneity
ABSTRAK
Kajian ini cuba menentukan hubungan jangka panjang di antara wang dan pendapatan di
Malaysia. Agregat kewangan Divisia dibentuk untuk Malaysia dan dibandingkan dengan agregat
kewangan Campuran-mudah untuk tempoh masa 1980:1 hingga 1994:4. Hubungan jangka
panjang di antara agregat-agregat kewangan dan pendapatan dinilai menggunakan kaedah dua
peringkat Engle-Granger (menguji kointegrasi) dan rangka kerja pembetulan-ralat untuk menguji
"weak exogeneity" dan "superexogeneity", Keputusan kajian menyarankan penggunaan agregat-
agregat kewangan sebagai petunjuk-petunjuk dasar tidak tertakluk kepada "Lucas critique" dan
juga agregat kewangan Divisia berpotensi digunakan untuk tujuan dasar kewangan di Malaysia.
ABSTRACT
In this study we attempt to investigate the long run relationship between money and income in
Malaysia. We constructed Divisia monetary aggregates for Malaysia and compared its performance
with the Simple-sum monetary aggregates for the period 1980:1 to 1994:4. The long run
relationship between the monetary aggregates and income were evaluated using the Engle-
Granger's two-step procedure (testing for cointegration) and the error-correction for weak
exogeneity and superexogeneity. Our result suggest that the use of monetary aggregates as policy
indicators are not subject to the Lucas critique and that there is potential role for Divisia
monetary aggregates as a useful guide for monetary policy purpose in Malaysia.
INTRODUCTION
The financial system in Malaysia has undergone
a radical structural transformation. In the 1960s,
the financial system was characterised by financial
markets dominated mainly by the Central Bank
and commercial banks with demand deposits
and currency as the main financial instruments
and regulated low interest rates. However, in
the 1990s, the scenario has turned into a more
efficient and sophisticated financial system
characterised, among other things, by the
prevalence of various non-bank financial
intermediaries, varieties of interest-bearing
financial assets with varying maturity dates and a
spectrum of interest rates offered, market-
determined interest rates and well-developed
money, commodity and capital markets.
The development within the financial system
has important implications for the purpose of
monetary policy. For the past forty years, the
Malaysian monetary authority has focused on
the narrow money supply Ml, as an indicator or
guide for monetary policy purposes. However,
more recently, the Central Bank has been
concerned with the behaviour and the stability
of money supply Ml as a policy tool. The Central
Bank realised that as a result of rapid growth
and innovations in the financial sector, there
has been a shift out of currency holdings and
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demand deposits into interest-bearing deposits
of the commercial banks, finance companies,
merchant banks and other non-bank financial
intermediaries, thus showing substitution between
non-interest-bearing and interest-bearing
financial assets (Bank Negara Malaysia 1985). As
a result more emphasis is now given to broader
money supply M2 and M3 for monetary
management.
The purpose of the present study is three-
fold. First, the study investigates the long-run
relationship between money and income in the
error-correction framework for a developing
country - Malaysia. Second, the study addresses
the issue of whether the Lucas critique is relevant
in the case of monetary aggregates used for
policy variables in Malaysia. Third, is to provide
alternatives to the monetary aggregates currently
defined and published by Bank Negara Malaysia.
The alternative monetary aggregate propose is
the Divisia aggregate which according to Barnett
(1980) (who pioneered this line of work), is an
appropriate measurement for the monetary
services of a nation.
METHODOLOGY
The Estimation Approaches
In recent years, discussion in econometric analysis
has focused on the time series properties of
economic variables. A key concept underlying
much of econometric theory is the assumption
of stationarity. This assumption has important
consequences for the interpretation of economic
models and data. This is so because the level of
a stationary series, for example, will not vary
greatly with the sampling period and has a
tendency to return to its mean value (Granger
1986; Hendry 1987). On the other hand, the
properties of non-stationary series, which are
more interesting to study, are quite different
from those of stationary ones because the former
will be characterised by a time varying mean
which have a tendency to drift away from its
mean. Some possible sources of non-stationarity
deal with polynomial time trends, unit roots and
integrated series (Granger 1986; Engle and
Granger 1987).
It is generally argued that testing for the
presence of unit roots in the autoregressive
representation of a time series can be considered
as testing for stationarity. This is because the test
amounts whether certain coefficients of the
representation are unity. Accordingly, the
question of how many times we should difference
the series or whether to detrend a series to
achieve stationary may also be answered.1
Since our interest is to determine the long-
run relationships between monetary aggregates
and nominal income, the first step is to
determine the order of integration of each of
the series involved. The standard procedure for
determining the order of integration of a time
series is the application of augmented Dickey-
Fuller test (Dickey and Fuller 1979) which
requires regressing Ayt on a constant, a time
trend, ytl and several lags of the dependent
variables to render the disturbance term white-
noise. Then the t-statistic on the estimated
coefficient of ytl is used to test the following null
and alternative hypothesis:
Ho : yt ~ 1(1) vs H, : yt ~ 1(0)
The null hypothesis is saying that variable yt is
stationary to the order one or it is integrated of
order one compared to the alternative that yt is
integrated of order zero. If the null cannot be
rejected, it is said that yt probably need to be
differenced once to achieve stationarity. If on
the other hand, the null is rejected then yt is
stationary in its level form. The critical values
are called the 'ADF statistics* and are available
in Fuller (1976), Engle and Yoo (1987) and in
MacKinnon (1991).
If the null hypothesis cannot be rejected
then yt is non-stationary and it may be 1(1) or
1(2), or have an even higher order of integration.
To find out the order of integration, the test is
repeated with Ayt in place of y|f thus regressing
A2yt on a constant, AyM and several lags of A2y(.
The ADF statistic therefore tests the following:
H o : Ay t~I(l) vs H, : Ayt ~ 1(0) i.e.
Ho : yt ~ 1(2) vs H, : yt ~ 1(1)
If the ADF statistic is not large and negative then
we cannot reject Ho and yt cannot be 1(1). In
this case the test is repeated with A3^ as the
1. For references and further discussion on unit roots, see Perman (1991) and Dolado et al (1990).
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dependent variable and so on, until the order of
integration is determined. To supplement the
ADF unit root test, we also estimate the Phillips
and Perron (1988) (hereafter the PP test) unit
root test. The PP unit root test is a non-
parametric method of detecting whether a time
series contains a unit root. This test is robust to
a wide variety of serial correlation and time
dependent heteroskedasticity.
After determining that the series are of the
same order of integration, we test whether the
linear combination of the series that are non-
stationary in levels are cointegrated. To conduct
the cointegration test, we follow the popular
Engle and Granger (1987) two-step procedure
for testing the null of no cointegration. The first
step of the Engle and Granger's procedure is to
determine a as the slope coefficient estimate
from the OLS regression of y on a constant (c)
and x. A test of cointegration is then that the
residuals |Xt (i.e. y^-ccx^ from the 'cointegrating
regression' be stationary. So in the second step,
the ADF unit root test is conducted on the
residual [iv so as to reject the null hypothesis of
integration (of order 1) in favour of stationarity,
using the critical values which are provided in
Engle and Yoo (1987) and MacKinnon (1991).
If the ADF statistics are not large and negative
then it is likely that the series are not
cointegrated. A less powerful test of cointegration
is the 'cointegrating regression Durbin-Watson'
(CRDW) statistic where cointegration is rejected
if the Durbin-Watson statistic is too low. The
critical values for CRDW are provided by Engle
and Yoo (1987).
If it was shown that x and y are both 1(1),
but are cointegrated, then the two series will be
generated by an error-correction model of the
following form,
= c0
(l.l)
where jutl is the lagged residuals saved from
running the static cointegrating regression with
y on a constant and x. The error-correction
mechanism (ECM) is usually referred to \iiA.
Our point of interest is that 9<0 and significant
implies that x and y are cointegrated.
Testing for Lucas Critique
The concept of exogeneity and its testable
application has been introduced by Engle et al
(1983) and Engle and Hendry (1993). Engle et
al. (1983) have proposed three types of
exogeneity: weak exogeneity, strong exogeneity
and superexogeneity. The test for exogeneity is
important because in empirical applications,
while only weak exogeneity is needed for
estimation purposes and for testing, and strong
exogeneity for forecasting, superexogeneity is
required for policy analysis According to Engle
et al (1983), the concept of superexogeneity is
closely associated with the Lucas (1976) critique.
Lucas (1976) argues that an econometric model
is unstable and will perform poorly in different
time period because the underlying structure
changes as expectation-generating mechanism
and/or policy regime changes over time.
Therefore, a relevant economic series or an
economic model needs to be invariant to these
changes to be useful for policy analysis.
Favero and Hendry (1992) have shown that
the concept of superexogeneity can be used to
examine if a policy variable is subject to the
Lucas (1976) critique. More recently, the
relevance of Lucas critique on the performance
of economic modelling has been subjected to
rigorous empirical investigations and testings in
the literature (Favero and Hendry 1992; Fischer
1989; Fischer and Peytrignet 1991; Caporale 1996;
Kwan and Kwok 1995; Kwan et al 1996). However,
the majority of the studies conclude that the
Lucas critique is not of empirical significance in
accounting for the failures of the econometric
models (see also Fischer 1988). Thus, in our
case, if a monetary aggregate possesses the
superexogeneity status, that is, the coefficient of
money variable is invariant to policy changes,
then policy evaluation using this approach is
possible and thus useful to the monetary
authority.
Lets consider the following simple regression
model,
yt = a + bxt + Ei (1.2)
where yt and x( have normal distribution with
means E(yt) = \it E(xt) • ^x and variances and
covariances given by var(yt) = a2 , var(xt) = CTX2,
and cov(yt,xt) = a . The conditional distribution
of yt given xt is,
JVlxt~ IND(a + bx, a2)
Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. Vol. 8 No. 2 2000
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where 'IND' denotes independently and normally
distributed, b = {%/o*)> and a2 = [ay2 - (e /%
 y
ax
2)]. The joint distribution of yt and xt can be
written as,
(1.4)
where g(y(lxt) involves the parameter <I> and
h(xt) is the marginal distribution of xt. Based on
equation (1.1), a variable is said to be weakly
exogenous for estimating a set of parameters <J>,
if inference on O conditional on xt involves no
loss of information. Weak exogeneity represents
a necessary condition for satisfactory single-
equation regression model. Furthermore, in a
dynamic context, weak exogeneity allows
feedback from the endogenous to the exogenous
variables and therefore, weak exogeneity may
tell us nothing about the direction of causality
of yt to xt or xt to yt. In other words, weak
exogeneity implies that the marginal distribution
h(xt) does not involve the parameter <I>. On the
other hand, if xt is weakly exogenous and is not
Granger caused by any of the lagged values of yt>
it is said to be strongly exogenous. Thus, Granger
non-causality (from yt to xt) is considered to be
a necessary condition for strong exogeneity. As
for superexogeneity, if xt is weakly exogenous
and the parameters in g(ytlxt) remain structurally
invariant to changes in the marginal distribution
of xt (i.e. to changes in regime or policy
interventions), then xt is said to be
superexogenous (Engle et al 1983).
In our case, to construct a test for the null
hypothesis that money, xt is weakly exogenous,
we first estimate an instrumental variable
estimates of xt, and then test for the presence of
the predicted values of xt in the dynamic error-
correction model. The significance of the
residuals or the fitted estimates from the
instrumental variables regression may be tested
with a ir or F-tests. In this study, the following
general autoregressive model for money supply
(the instrumental variable equation) is estimated,
where dummy variables, DUM act as proxies for
possible structural breaks. The estimated wi is
then substituted in the conditional model
specified by equation (1.1) as follows,
(1.6)
If tnt is significant in terms of the t-statistic in the
dynamic error-correction model, then the null
hypothesis that money is weakly exogenous is
rejected. On the other hand, to test for
superexogeneity, the estimated tnt and the square
estimated tnt2 are included in equation (1.1) and
test for their joint significance as follows,
W • (1.7)
A significant .F-test indicates a rejection of
superexogeneity.
Sources of Data and the Construction of Dixnsia
Aggregates
Data on money supply Ml and M2, monetary
components, bank reserves, rates of return on
financial assets, bank lending rate used in the
computation of the Divisia monetary aggregates
were collected from various issues of Quarterly
Economic Bulletin published by Bank Negara
Malaysia.
Despite the ability of money supply Ml, M2
and M3 to predict nominal income in Malaysia,
the practice of Bank Negara Malaysia in
computing the national money supply aggregates
is flawed. Barnett (1980) has emphasized that
the conventional "Simple-sum" monetary
aggregate which was calculated on the
assumption that their components receive equal
weights of one, is an incorrect measurement of
the flow of monetary services. Following Barnett
(1980) , a Divisia monetary aggregate is
constructed in the following manner: Let qit and
pit represent the quantities and user costs of
each asset to be included in the aggregate at
time t. The expenditure share on the services of
monetary asset i in period t is:
(1.8)
The user cost (Barnett 1978) of each asset is
measured as:
ft = (R, - r.)/(l + R,) (1.9)
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where Rt is the benchmark rate, the maximum
[r- r.; i=l,2,...,n). j=l,2,..k. i*j]. The growth rate
of a Divisia aggregate then can be written as
sit*G(qil) (1.10)
where s.* = 0.5(s.t+s.t]) and n is the number of
assets in the aggregate. Single period changes,
beginning with a base period can be cumulated
to determine the level of the Divisia aggregate in
each succeeding period.
Details of the monetary components and
their respective user costs in constructing the
Divisia monetary aggregates are presented in
Table I.2 From Table 1, we can observe that the
rate of return on currency is assumed to be zero
since it is a perfectly liquid asset. On the other
hand, although the explicit rate of return on
demand deposits is also zero, Offenbacher (1980)
and Barnett et al (1981) strongly argue that an
implicit rate of return must be imputed to
demand deposits, if the substitutability between
currency and demand deposits is to be estimable.
Barnett (1982: p. 699) proposes that, 'In some
cases implicit rates of return must be used in
computing the interest rates in the formula p.,
especially when the own rate of return on an
asset is subject to governmental rate regulation.
An implicit imputation is also used in the
measurement of R. The Divisia quantity index
has been found to be robust to those imputations
within the plausible ranges of error in the
imputation*.
However, the proper implicit rate imputation
for demand deposits remains an open issue.
Following Offenbacher (1980), the approach
taken in this study is to compute an implicit rate
using Klein's (1974) methodology. The formula
used for constructing the implicit rate on demand
deposits (DDr) is given as follows
DDr = r. [1 - (BR/DD)] (1.11)
where rL is the rate of return on bank's earning
assets and BR is bank reserves on demand
deposits. As for the benchmark asset, as shown
in Table 1, we follow the envelope approach,
that is, a series of benchmark rate is formed by
selecting the benchmark rate which is higher
than the rate of return of each monetary asset
components. This will ensure that p^O
(Mullineux 1996). Furthermore, Binner (1990)
proposes adding 0.10 points to the benchmark
TABLE 1
Information used to construct divisia aggregates
Money Asset Components Rate of Return
Ml Currency in circulation
Demand deposits
M2 Saving deposits
Fixed deposits
Negotiable Certificate of Deposits
Repurchase agreement (Repos)
Benchmark asset
Zero
Implicit rate of return. Using Klein's (1974) method. The basic
formula for computing Demand deposit rate of return (DDr) is
as follows;
DDr = rL*(l-RRDD), where rL is commercial bank's base lending
rate (percent p.a.), and RRDD is reserve requirement on demand
deposits.
Savings deposit rate (SDr) in percent p.a.
Fixed deposit rate (FDr). FDr= max [(r)] , where i=l, 3, 6, 9 8c
12 months maturity (percent p.a.).
Rate on NCDs (NCDr). Proxied with the Interbank rates, r.
NCDr= max [(r.)], where i=overnight, 7-days, 1 month & 3-
months call money (percent p.a,).
Repo rate (REPOr). Proxied with the call money rate at discount
houses, r. REPOr= max [(r,)], where i=3, 6 8c 12-months maturity
(percent p.a.).
Maximum available rate. Max - {[Ddr, SDr, FDr? NCDr, REPOr, rj
+ 0.1}, where i~rates at commercial banks and Finance companies; j**
Treasury bill rates (3, 6 &* 12-months) and yield on Goverment
securities (5 & 20 years).
Source. Author's calculation.
2. Divisia M3 is excluded from the analysis because data on savings and fixed deposits at discount houses and Bank Islam,
interest rates on deposits at merchant banks, discount houses and Bank Islam are not available.
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where 'IND' denotes independently and normally
distributed, b = ( o ^ / a / ) , and a2 = [ay2 - (o^/
ax
2)]. The joint distribution of yt and xt can be
written as,
(1.4)
where g(yjxt) involves the parameter O and
h(xt) is the marginal distribution of xt. Based on
equation (1.1), a variable is said to be weakly
exogenous for estimating a set of parameters O,
if inference on O conditional on xt involves no
loss of information. Weak exogeneity represents
a necessary condition for satisfactory single-
equation regression model. Furthermore, in a
dynamic context, weak exogeneity allows
feedback from the endogenous to the exogenous
variables and therefore, weak exogeneity may
tell us nothing about the direction of causality
of y to x{ or xt to yt. In other words, weak
exogeneity implies that the marginal distribution
h(xt) does not involve the parameter <I>. On the
other hand, if xt is weakly exogenous and is not
Granger caused by any of the lagged values of yt,
it is said to be strongly exogenous. Thus, Granger
non-causality (from y( to xt) is considered to be
a necessary condition for strong exogeneity. As
for superexogeneity, if xt is weakly exogenous
and the parameters in g(ytlxt) remain structurally
invariant to changes in the marginal distribution
of xt (i.e. to changes in regime or policy
interventions), then xt is said to be
superexogenous (Engle et al 1983).
In our case, to construct a test for the null
hypothesis that money, xt is weakly exogenous,
we first estimate an instrumental variable
estimates of xt, and then test for the presence of
the predicted values of xt in the dynamic error-
correction model. The significance of the
residuals or the fitted estimates from the
instrumental variables regression may be tested
with a l - o r F-tests. In this study, the following
general autoregressive model for money supply
(the instrumental variable equation) is estimated,
=
 ao (1.5)
where dummy variables, DUM act as proxies for
possible structural breaks. The estimated ujt is
then substituted in the conditional model
specified by equation (1.1) as follows,
(1.6)
If tnt is significant in terms of the t-statistic in the
dynamic error-correction model, then the null
hypothesis that money is weakly exogenous is
rejected. On the other hand, to test for
superexogeneity, the estimated w{ and the square
estimated tut2 are included in equation (1.1) and
test for their joint significance as follows,
= c0
(1.7)
A significant F-test indicates a rejection of
superexogeneity.
Sources of Data and the Construction of Divisia
Aggregates
Data on money supply Ml and M2, monetary
components, bank reserves, rates of return on
financial assets, bank lending rate used in the
computation of the Divisia monetary aggregates
were collected from various issues of Quarterly
Economic Bulletin published by Bank Negara
Malaysia.
Despite the ability of money supply Ml, M2
and M3 to predict nominal income in Malaysia,
the practice of Bank Negara Malaysia in
computing the national money supply aggregates
is flawed. Barnett (1980) has emphasized that
the conventional "Simple-sum" monetary
aggregate which was calculated on the
assumption that their components receive equal
weights of one, is an incorrect measurement of
the flow of monetary services. Following Barnett
(1980), a Divisia monetary aggregate is
constructed in the following manner: Let qu and
pk represent the quantities and user costs of
each asset to be included in the aggregate at
time t. The expenditure share on the services of
monetary asset i in period t is:
(1.8)
The user cost (Barnett 1978) of each asset is
measured as:
(1.9)
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where Rt is the benchmark rate, the maximum
[r, r; i=l,2,...,n). j=l,2,..k. i*j]. The growth rate
of a Divisia aggregate then can be written as
(1.10)
where s.* = 0.5(sit+sjt]) and n is the number of
assets in the aggregate. Single period changes,
beginning with a base period can be cumulated
to determine the level of the Divisia aggregate in
each succeeding period.
Details of the monetary components and
their respective user costs in constructing the
Divisia monetary aggregates are presented in
Table I.2 From Table 1, we can observe that the
rate of return on currency is assumed to be zero
since it is a perfectly liquid asset. On the other
hand, although the explicit rate of return on
demand deposits is also zero, Offenbacher (1980)
and Barnett et al (1981) strongly argue that an
implicit rate of return must be imputed to
demand deposits, if the substitutability between
currency and demand deposits is to be estimable.
Barnett (1982: p. 699) proposes that, 'In some
cases implicit rates of return must be used in
computing the interest rates in the formula p.,
especially when the own rate of return on an
asset is subject to governmental rate regulation.
An implicit imputation is also used in the
measurement of R. The Divisia quantity index
has been found to be robust to those imputations
within the plausible ranges of error in the
imputation'.
However, the proper implicit rate imputation
for demand deposits remains an open issue.
Following Offenbacher (1980), the approach
taken in this study is to compute an implicit rate
using Klein's (1974) methodology. The formula
used for constructing the implicit rate on demand
deposits (DDr) is given as follows
DDr = r. [1 - (BR/DD)] (1.11)
where rL is the rate of return on bank's earning
assets and BR is bank reserves on demand
deposits. As for the benchmark asset, as shown
in Table 1, we follow the envelope approach,
that is, a series of benchmark rate is formed by
selecting the benchmark rate which is higher
than the rate of return of each monetary asset
components. This will ensure that p^O
(Mullineux 1996). Furthermore, Binner (1990)
proposes adding 0.10 points to the benchmark
TABLE 1
Information used to construct divisia aggregates
Money Asset Components Rate of Return
Ml Currency in circulation
Demand deposits
M2 Saving deposits
Fixed deposits
Negotiable Certificate of Deposits
Repurchase agreement (Repos)
Benchmark asset
Zero
Implicit rate of return. Using Klein's (1974) method. The basic
formula for computing Demand deposit rate of return (DDr) is
as follows;
DDr = rL*(l-RRDD), where rL is commercial bank's base lending
rate (percent p.a.), and RRDD is reserve requirement on demand
deposits.
Savings deposit rate (SDr) in percent p.a.
Fixed deposit rate (FDr). FDr= max [(r)] ( where i=l, 3, 6, 9 &
12 months maturity (percent p.a.).
Rate on NCDs (NCDr). Proxied with the Interbank rates, r.
NCDr= max [(r)] , where i=overnight, 7-days, 1 month & 3-
months call money (percent p.a.).
Repo rate (REPOr). Proxied with the call money rate at discount
houses, r. REPOr= max [(r,)]( where i=3, 6 & 12-months maturity
(percent p.a.).
Maximum available rate. Max - {[Ddr, SDr? FDr^ NCDr, REPOr, rj
+ O.lj, where i*rates at commercial banks and Finance companies; j=
Treasury bill rates (3, 6 & 12-months) and yield on Goverment
securities (5 & 20 years).
Source. Author's calculation.
2. Divisia M3 is excluded from the analysis because data on savings and fixed deposits at discount houses and Bank Islam,
interest rates on deposits at merchant banks, discount houses and Bank Islam are not available.
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rate to ensure that this rate will be non-zero.
As for income variable, since GNP is only
available annually, we follow Gandolfo's (1981)
technique to interpolating quarterly data from
annual observations.
THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Results of Integration Tests
Table 2 presents the results of the unit root tests
on the levels and first-differences of the series.
In order to choose the appropriate lag length,
we follow the procedure suggested by Campbell
and Perron (1991). According to this approach,
we start with some upper bound on k, say kmax,
chosen a priori. Estimate an autoregression of
order kmax. If the last included lag is significant
(using the standard normal asymptotic
distribution), select k=kmax. If not, reduce the
order of the estimated autoregression by one
until the coefficient on the last included lag is
significant. If none is significant, select k=0.
Results in Table 2 clearly indicate that income
and all four monetary aggregates are stationary
after they have been first-differenced. In Table
3, we present the results of the cointegration test
between the monetary aggregates and income.
The results of the unit root test on the residuals
of the cointegrating regressions for all monetary
aggregates suggest that the null hypothesis of
non-cointegration can be rejected at five percent
significance level. But, on the contrary, the
CRDW statistics indicate that there is no long-
run relationship between income and both the
Series
Simple-sum
Simple-sum
Divisia Ml
Divisia M2
Income
Ml
M2
TABLE 2
Results of integration tests
Series in levels
ADF
-1.04 (6)
-0.50 (1)
-1.28 (4)
-1.44 (4)
-0.09 (8)
PP
-0.28 (3)
-0.32 (3)
-0.28 (3)
-1.28 (3)
-1.28 (3)
Series in
ADF
-3.34* (5)
-5.58** (1)
-7.80** (1)
-6.19** (1)
-4.45** (3)
first-differences
PP
-7.89** (3)
-6.84** (3)
-7.99** (3)
-8.39** (3)
-5.59** (3)
Notes: Asterisks {*), (**) denote statistically significant at 10 and 5 percent level respectively. The critical values are -3.49 (1%) and -
3.18 (10%) (see MacKinnon, 1991).
Series
Simple-sum
Simple-sum
Divisia Ml
Divisia M2
Ml
M2
TABLE 3
Results of cointegration tests
Cointegrating regressions
Coefficient on regressors
Constant a R2
1.70
1.39
0.05
0.90
0.84 0.98
0.77 0.96
1.02 0.98
0.83 0.96
CRDW
0.48
0.22
0.54
0.21
ADF auxiliary
regressions
ADF Lags
-3.87** 4
-3.68** 3
-4.27** 4
-3.38* 12
Notes: At 5 percent significance level, the critical values for CRDW is 0.78 (see Engle and Yoo, 1987), and cointegration test is -3.45 (see
MacKinnon, 1991). Asterisks (*), (**) denote statistically significant at 10 and 5 percent level respectively.
3. Engle and Yoo (1987: p. 157) note that, "We have examined the behavior of the Durbin-Watson statistic from the co-
integrating regression. Unfortunately, the discrepancy between the critical values for different systems remains significant
even for the sample size two hundred. This is not surprising since the statistic is not asymptotically similar as are the
preceeding tests. Hence this statistic does not appear to be useful for testing co-integration".
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TABLE 4
Results of error-correction models
Variables
Constant
ECM,.,
Ay
Ay
Ay
Ay(^
**»
Ay
Amt
Am
Am
Am i7
Am
«-N
Am
Am
Am t l 9
D84:l
D84:2
D86:l
R-squared
SER
DW
Weak exogeneity test:
/-statistic on 0t
Superexogeneity test:
/-statistic on 0j
/-statistic on 02
/^statistic, 0,n02=O
Simple-sum Ml
0.0147
(9.9107)*
-0.1282
(6.9545)*
0.5441
(11.647)*
0.1523
(3.7358)*
-0.2487
(5.7118)*
-0.0697
(3.4623)*
0.0533
(2.2491)*
-0.1801
(6.2235)*
-0.1031
(3.0923)*
0.1936
(5.3586)*
0.0575
(2.1047)*
0.1938
(5.9527)*
-0,0893
(2.9004)*
0.1129
(3.6200)*
0.92
0.003
2.68
0.3373
0.3386
1.2406
0.827 [0.452]
Simple-sum M2
0.0080
(2.7156)*
-0.1134
(3.0237)*
0.7221
(10.253)*
-0.3944
(7.4493)*
0.5254
(7.6567)*
-0.3788
(6.4828)*
0.2583
(6.2560)*
-0.0558
(2.6248)*
0.0844
(2.6111)*
0.0659
(2.0333)*
-0.0764
(1.8758)
-0.1003
(2.6688)*
0.0717
(2.2513)*
-0.0866
(2.2492)*
0.0801
(2.2190)*
0.0945
(2.6790)*
0.95
0.003
2.53
0.1843
0.2249
-0.2998
0.061 [0.941]
Divisia Ml
0.0122
(4.9017)*
-0.2638
(7.0821)*
0.2169
(4.0415)*
0.1858
(3.3911)*
0.1343
(2.2128)*
0.0145
(0.2122)
-0.0599
(6.0728)*
0.82
0.009
1.49
-0.8184
-0.4960
-1.5263
1.513 [0.235]
Divisia M2
-0.0015
(0.6821)
-0.0411
(2.9624)*
1.0098
(22.474)*
-0.3633
(9.6407)*
0.3558
(9.5287)*
-0,3504
(10.931)*
0.3566
(11.022)*
0.0508
(1.5161)
0.1078
(17.598)*
-0.1106
(12.586)*
0.97
0.005
2.36
0.4329
0.4993
-0.6900
0.330 [0.721]
Notes: ECM denotes error-correction term, i.e. the residuals from running the static cointegrating regression. SER denotes
standard error of regression. DW denotes Durbin-Watson statistic. D denotes dummry variable. Numbers in parentheses (,) are
/-statistics and numbers in the square brackets [.] are Rvalues. Asterisk (*) denotes statistically significant at the 5% level.
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Simple-sum and Divisia monetary aggregates (Ml
and M2). Nevertheless, since CRDW statistic has
low power compared to the Engle-Granger's
two-step approach,3 we conclude that there is
long-run relationship between monetary
aggregates and income in Malaysia.
Results of the error-correction models
estimated for each of the monetary aggregates
are presented in Table 4. For all error-correction
models estimated, the final models were derived
according to the Hendry's 'general-to-specific'
specification search and the congruency of the
models with the data generating process (Hendry
1987) are observed from a battery of diagnostic
tests which include the test for serial correlation,
heteroskedasticity, normality of the residuals and
incorrect functional form (not reported here in
order to conserve space, but is available from
the author upon request). Generally, the
diagnostic tests indicate well-fitting error-
correction models for each monetary aggregates
that fulfills the condition of serial non-
correlation, homoskedasticity, normality of
residuals and no specification errors.
A very important observation is made from
Table 4. The results for both Simple-sum and
Divisia money (Ml and M2) suggest that money
and income is cointegrated. In all four estimated
equations, the coefficient of the error-correction
terms are significantly different from zero at the
five percent level. The t-statistics of the ECM
terms are large and negative, and therefore
support the notion that monetary aggregates
and income in Malaysia exhibit long-run
relationships over the period under study. This
result suggests that both Simple-sum and Divisia
money (both Ml and M2) are good intermediate
indicators for monetary policy purpose.
The results of weak exogeneity tests as shown
by the significance of the t-statistics of mt in the
conditional models are presented in the lower
section of Table 4. The results clearly indicate
that for all four monetary aggregates, when the
residuals mi from the money supply equation is
added to the conditional model, the coefficient
of wi is insignificantly different from zero at the
five percent level. This indicates that Malaysia's
monetary aggregates are weakly exogenous in
the income equation. As a consequence, the use
of a single-equation regression in estimating the
impact of monetary aggregates on income is
justified. And when both mt and mt2 were included
in the income equation, the results of the F-test
indicate that their coefficients are statistically
insignificant at the five percent level, joint
hypothesis of superexogeneity cannot be rejected.
This finding suggests that the monetary
aggregates are not subject to the Lucas critique.
CONCLUSION
The question of the appropriate empirical
definition of money is one of the most debatable
and unsettled issues in economics. A survey by
Kumah (1989) indicates that in general, the
measurement of money supply used by the
monetary authorities for over 150 countries is
limited to Ml, M2 and M3, depending on the
level of development or monetisation of the
financial system. As the financial sector develops,
new financial intermediaries emerge, offering
varieties of interest-bearing financial assets with
various maturity dates, and these financial assets
will be added as components of money giving a
broader concept of monetary aggregates.
However, the practice of adding the components
of financial assets together without appropriately
taking into consideration the weight of each
assets components was criticised by Barnett
(1980). They argued that in monetary
aggregation, it is not which assets are to be
included in the measure of money supply which
is important, but rather how much of each
monetary asset is to be included. This points to
the conclusion that each component should be
given a different weight when adding the various
components of financial assets to arrive at the
official monetary aggregates.
In this study we have constructed and
computed Divisia monetary aggregates for
Malaysia. The purpose of this paper is to
investigate the long-run relationships between
the alternative monetary aggregates and national
income during the era of financial innovation
and deregulation in Malaysia. Alternative
monetary aggregates included in the analysis are
Simple-sum (both Ml and M2) and Divisia (both
Ml and M2) monetary aggregates. The Divisia
aggregates are constructed using the method
proposed by Barnett (1980). The long-run
relationships between the monetary aggregates
and national income were evaluated using the
Engle-Granger's two-step procedure (testing for
cointegration) and the error-correction
framework.
The major results of this paper may be
summarised as follows: First, the empirical tests
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indicate that income and all four monetary
aggregates employed in this study are integrated
of order one. Second, the cointegration test
between the monetary aggregates and nominal
income using the Engle-Granger's two-step
procedure suggests that the two series are
cointegrated. Third, our error-correction models
further support the long-run relationships
between money and income in Malaysia. Fourth,
our weak exogeneity test suggests that the
estimated single-equation error-correction model
for income is well specified. Fifth, the
superexogeneity test indicates that the use of
monetary aggregates as policy indicators are not
subject to the Lucas critique and therefore
suggests that using monetary aggregates for
making policy evaluation is possible. Finally, we
conclude that there is potential role for Divisia
monetary aggregate as a useful guide for
monetary policy purpose in Malaysia.
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APPENDIX
The estimated instrumental variable regressions (i.e. money supply reaction function) used in the
exogeneity tests are recorded below;
Asm^ = 0.0307 + 0.2167Asmlu - 0.2614Asml^
(5.2783) (2.0997) (2.1507)
+ 0.3537Asml t l2 - 0.2841Asml t l7 - 0.0569D86:l
(3.2847) 2.3287) (2.6871)
- 0.0505D92:2 + 0.1164D93:4 (Al)
(2.6380) (5,8554)
R2 = 0.766 D.W. = 1.90
Asm2t = 0.0625 - 0.2901Asm2ul3 - 0.4685Asm2M8
(8.2860) (2.0667) (3.5736)
- 0.3852Asm2t.19 - 0.0379D88:l - 0.0369D90:2
(2.5135) (2.4951) (2.3929)
- 0.03131D91:2 + 0.0453D93:4 + 0.0694D94:l (A2)
(2.0875) (3.0422) (4.5874)
R2 = 0.735 D.W. = 2.19
Adml t = 0.0165 + 0.5141AdmlM - 0.2238Adml t l o
(3.8479) (5.4929) (2.3337)
+ 0.2545Adml t l 2 - 0.0680D84:3 - 0.0344D84:4
(2.5189) (4.4220) (2.1834)
- 0.0548D85:2 - 0.0339D90:4 (A3)
(3.5096) (2.1439)
R2 = 0.773 D.W. = 2.00
Adm2 t = 0.0240 + 0.3702Adm2Ht - 0.3202Adm2^ + 0.0662D87:2
(3.8097) (2.7508) (2.1909) (2.9371)
+ 0.0678D94:l (A4)
(3.2184)
R2 = 0.373 D.W. - 2.18
The data are quarterly and cover the period 1981:1-1994:4. sm. and dm. denote Simple-sum and
Divisia money respectively and j = 1,2 (1=M1, 2=M2). The inclusion of dummies, D proxy for regime
shifts is also necessary to produce homoscedastic residuals. And A is the difference operator.
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ABSTRAK
Kajian ini menyelidik hubungan jangka panjang di antara kadar pertukaran wang asing dan
permintaan wang di Malaysia. Keputusan ujian nisbah kebolehjadian Johansen-Juselius (1990)
menyokong kepentingan kadar pertukaran asing bagi m2 tetapi tidak bagi ml. Keputusan ujian
nisbah kebolehjadian Hansen-Johansen (1993) pula mendapati parameter jangka masa panjang
adalah tidak stabil disebabkan kesan krisis kewangan di rantau ini. Keseluruhan analisa mendapati
hanya sebahagian keputusan empirikal menyokong hubungan di antara kadar pertukaran wang
asing dengan permintaan wang.
ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the long run relationship between exchange rate and money demand in
Malaysia. The Johansen-Juselius (1990) likelihood ratio tests support the importance of exchange
rate in m2 but not in ml money demand. The Hansen-Johansen (1993) likelihood ratio tests
however found some evidence of instability in the long run parameters and this could be due to
the recent financial crisis in this region. Overall analysis has provided support to the empirical
investigation of the relation between exchange rate and money demand.
INTRODUCTION
This study empirically investigates the long-run
relationship between exchange rate and money
demand in Malaysia. The precursor to this
study was the work of Mundell (1963). Mundell
argued that in addition to the interest rate and
income, the demand for money is likely to
depend upon the exchange rate. Therefore, an
important feature of this study is, firstly, to
conduct a specific test using the likelihood ratio
(LR) test proposed byjohansen and Juselius (J-
J) (1990) whether the exchange rate can be
considered as an additional determinant of the
demand for money in Malaysia. Secondly, if
exchange rate is accepted in the cointegrating
space of money demand, this study proceeds
with the specific test developed by Hansen and
Johansen (H-J) (1993) for testing the long-run
parameters constancy.
There are a number of seminal studies on
various issues relating to the demand for money
in Malaysia, for example, Semudram (1981);
Rahim (1986); and Ghaffar and Habibullah
(1987). Most of these studies used partial
adjustment specification. Moreover none of
them explored the series properties and the
cointegration technique. A recent paper by
Tseng and Corker (1991), however, investigate
on different issue such as the impact of financial
liberalisation by focusing on the source of
instability during the 1980s. This study attempts
to determine whether the exchange rate can be
considered as an additional determinant of the
demand for money and its long-run parameters
stability.
Having mentioned the introduction above,
the following sections present the model,
empirical results and finally the study's
concluding remarks.
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THE MODELS AND THE
SOURCES OF DATA
Two different models are estimated. Firstly, the
base-line model using the Goldfeld-type (1973)
approach:
log mi = a + b log yt + c log wj + £t (1.0)
and secondly, the augmented model to include
the nominal exchange rate:
log m = a + b log y + c log *V + d log ext + 8t
(2.0)
where m is the real money stock, y is the real
income, it is an opportunity cost variable1; and
ex is the nominal exchange rate; with the
following theoretical expected sign: b> 0; c< 0;
d < 02. Two definitions of money stock are
utilised namely, narrow money (ml) and broad
money (m2)3. The real gross domestic product
(GDP) is used as a scale variable. The 3-month
Treasury Bill rate is used as a proxy of an
opportunity cost and finally the nominal
exchange rate is measured by the US dollar
(USD) per unit of Malaysian Ringgit (RM). The
Consumer Price Index (CPI) is used as a deflator.
The quarterly data used spanning 1987:ql
to 1998:q2. The sample period 1987:ql is chosen
as a starting point because neither quarterly
data of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) nor Gross
National Product (GNP) is available in Malaysia
before this period. All data are collected from
the Bank Negara Malaysia (Central Bank of
Malaysia) Quarterly Bulletins except the GDP is
collected from the published reports by the
Department of Statistics, Malaysia.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The integration properties of the individual series
are investigated by using the augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) test4. The lag length is determined
based on the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC)5.
The results show that all variables are stationary
in their first differences. The results are
summarised in Table 1.0. Clearly, the results
indicate that all series are stationary after first
differences.
As mentioned before, both equations (1.0)
and (2.0) are estimated using the Johansen-
Juselius (1990) maximum likelihood
cointegration procedures. The choice of lag
length k or the order of VARs system is based on
the SBC procedure. The results indicate that
TABLE 1.0
Summary of augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test statistics
Series
ml
y
ir
ex
Include an
intercept but
not a trend
-1.8779[1]
-0.4848[l]
-1.7409[2]
-1.7037[l]
-0.7149[3]
Levels
include an
intercept and a
linear trend
-1.1319[1]
-3.0008[l]
-2.1882[2]
-1.7363[1]
-0.4339 [3]
First
include an
intercept but
not a trend
-3.8462[1]*
-4.9913[1]*
-11.668[1]*
-4.7199[1]*
-3.7519[1]*
differences
Include an
intercept and a
linear trend
-4.2511[1]*
-4.8226[1]*
-11.976[1]*
-4.5754[1]*
-4.3592[1]*
Notes:
Numbers in brackets are the lag lengths based on SBC.
* denotes significant at the 5% level.
1. iris computed as log (1 + ir)
2. A simple interpretation on d < 0 is that as result of depreciation of the Malaysian Ringgit ( a decrease in ex), the demand
for cash balances in Malaysia increases.
3. Ml is defined as currency and demand deposits held by the non-bank private sector held at the commercial banks, plus net
issues of NCD to the private sector and repo transactions affected by the commercial banks (Bank Negara Malaysia 1994;
410).
4. See Engle and Granger (1987).
5. See Schwartz (1978).
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TABLE 2.0
Cointegration analysis (with unrestricted intercept and no trends)
Set 1
Set 2
Set 3
Set 4
Series in
cointegrating
Vector
ml, y, ir
m2, y, ir
ml, yt ir, ex
m% y, ir, ex
Null
r - 0
r< 1
r< 2
r= 0
r < 1
r < 2
r= 0
r < 1
r < 2
r < 3
r= 0
r< 1
r< 2
r < 3
Alternative
r= 1
r« 2
r= 3
r= 1
r= 2
r - 3
r= 1
r« 2
r - 3
r« 4
r= 1
r - 2
r - 3
r= 4
K~
77.56*
5.94
2.64
27.23*
3.82
1.74
82.16*
11.59
7.92
0.28
31.83*
19.99
8.22
0.94
95%
critical
values
21.12
14.88
8.07
21.12
14.88
8.07
27.42
21.12
14.88
8.07
27.42
21.12
14.88
8.07
\ ™
86.14*
8.58
2.64
32.79*
5.56
L74
101.96*
19.80
8.20
0.28
60.98*
29.15
9.16
0.94
95%
critical
values
31.54
17.86
8.07
31.54
17.86
8.07
48.88
31.54
17.86
8.07
48.88
31.54
17.86
8.07
Notes:
r is the number of cointegrating vector.
* denotes significant at the 95% level.
Test is carried out using CATS in RATS package
the order of VARs at 3 are acceptable by the
data representation with unrestricted intercept
and no trends for Sets 1 and 2. Whilst, the
order of 2 is acceptable for Sets 3 and 4 with
unrestricted intercept and no trends. In Table
2.0, the results of cointegration analysis for four
set of variables are summarised. The first two
sets of variables belong to equation (1.0). Whilst
the last two sets belong to equation (2.0) where
the nominal exchange rate is included in ml
and w2 money demand, respectively.
Based on the maximal eigenvalues (Amax)
and trace statistic (k ), both tests strongly
x
 trace' ' ° '
reject the null of no cointegration (r = 0) for
each set of variables of interest. Furthermore,
both tests also accept that at most the presence
of one cointegrating vector (CV) in each set of
variables. Hence, there is no significant evidence
of more than one cointegrating vector for all
sets of variables.
As indicated in the Introduction, the J-J
likelihood ratio test is conducted to determine
whether the exchange rate belongs to the
cointegrating space of each money demand
function. This test is based on the estimated
eigenvalues of restricted X* (without exchange
rate) and unrestricted X (with exchange rate)
ith cointegrating vector6, as follows:
(3.0)
Asymptotically, this statistic has a %2 distribution
with r(p-s) degrees of freedom, where r is the
number of cointegrating vector, p is the
dimension of unrestricted cointegrating space
and s is the dimension of restricted cointegrating
space. The restriction embedded in the null
hypothesis is binding if the calculated value of
the test statistics exceeds that in a %2 table. The
test results are summarised in Table 3.0.
The tests indicate that the exchange rate
can be excluded from the ml cointegrating space.
Whilst in the w2 cointegrating space, it is
permissible to include the exchange rate in the
model. Based on these findings, the following
discussion will only focus on testing the stability
of long-run parameters of m2 money demand
where nominal exchange rate is included in the
cointegrating vector. To test whether the
estimated long-run parameters are stable over
time in the cointegrating space x*=[m2, y, iry ex],
6. See, Bahmani-Oskooee et al. (1998) for more recent application of this technique.
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TABLE 3.0
The J-J likelihood ratio tests of restricted and unrestricted cointegrating vectors
Series Normalised Restricted Unrestricted
in Cointegrating Eigenvalue Eigenvalue X2» (p~s)r
Vector X* X
Remark
Set 1
vs.
Set 3
Set 2
vs.
Set 4
[1.0, -2.5, 3.1]
[1.0, -2.6, 3.3, -0.1]
[1.0, -2.9, 2.8]
[1.0, -2.8, 3.4, -0.3]
0.8284
0.4615
X2(l) = exchange rate can be
0.75 excluded from ml
0.8455 cointegrating vector
X2(l) • exchange rate can be
4.595* included in m2
0.5149 cointegrating vector
Notes:
The critical value of X2(l) = 3-84 (2.71) at the 5% (10%) significance level.
Sample
1987ql - 1998q2
1987ql - 1998ql
1987ql - 1997q4
1987ql - 1997q3
1987ql - 1997q2
1987ql - 1997ql
Notes:
@ The critical value of va(3)
Testing
No. of cv
1
1
1
1
1
1
= 7.81 at the 5%
TABLE 4.0
the long-run parameters constancy
Eigenvalue (t)
0.5149 (44)
0.5877 (43)
0.7356 (41)
0.7328 (41)
0.7120 (40)
0.7247 (39)
sigificance level.
H-J statistics®
-6.99
- 25.49*
-24.45*
- 20.86*
- 22.09*
Remark
accept Ho
reject Ho
reject Ho
reject Ho
reject Ho
the following H-J likelihood ratio test statistics is
utilised:
(4.0)
which has a X2 distribution with (p-r) r degrees of
freedom, where p is the dimension of
cointegrating space and r is the number of
cointegrating vector. In equation (4.0), A* is
the largest eigenvalue from the corresponding
subsamples and X is the largest eigenvalue from
the whole sample. The intuition behind this test
is that small values for the test statistics imply
that the estimated long-run parameters are stable
over time. The test results are summarised in
Table 4.0.
As reported in Table 4.0, the statistics shows
the following results: (1) most of the
cointegraung vectors take the sign pattern that
is consistent with money demand; (2) in all
selected subsamples and the whole sample, the
cointegrating vector remains at 1; (3) the H-J
test rejects the long-run parameter stability in all
subsamples after 1997:4. This result implies that
in spite of the acceptance of exchange rate as an
additional determinant in m2 money demand,
the recent East Asian financial crisis7 has probably
caused instability of the long-run parameters.
However, there is no evidence of a structural
shift in broad money demand prior to the
financial crisis,
CONCLUSION
The Johansen-Juselius (1990) likelihood ratio
tests strongly support the importance of exchange
rate in m2 but not in ml money demand function
in Malaysia. The positive sign on the exchange
rate and negative sign for treasury bill in the
normalised m2 vector perhaps indicate that the
7. As a result of this crisis, the Malaysia Ringgit depreciated nearly 60% against the US dollar.
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US dollar as well as treasury bill are substitutes
for monetary assets. Hence the possibility of
currency substitution between Malaysian Ringgit
and the dollar cannot be ruled out. Thus
providing some support to McKinnon's (1982)
hypothesis of currency substitution.
The Hansen-Johansen (1993) likelihood
ratio tests provide some evidence of instability in
the long-run parameters after 1997q:4 and this
could be due to the recent financial crisis in this
region. In conclusion, the whole analysis has
provided a partial support to the empirical
investigation of a stable long-run relationship
between exchange rate and money demand in
Malaysia.
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ABSTRAK
Kajian ini menilai rasional ekonomi untuk mengganti juruaudit oleh firma-firma tersenarai
dengan meneliti kesan keputusan ini terhadap perubahan harga saham firma-firma tersebut (atau
dikenali juga sebagai kesan harta). Keputusan pihak pengurusan firma untuk mengekal atau
menggantikan juruaudit ini melibatkan satu perubahan ke atas firma-firma audit yang berbeza
kualiti. Kualiti audit ditakrifkan dengan mengklasifikasikan firma-firma audit kepada firma-firma
Tahap 1 (Big-5) dan firma-firma Tahap 2 (bukan-Big 5). Ciri yang membezakan antara dua
kumpulan produk audit dipercayai menjadi kredibiliti yang dibawa oleh setiap kumpulan dalam
perjanjian audit. Faktor-faktor yang berhubung dengan pilihan firma audit dan perubahan untuk
ciri-ciri firma berkaitan pilihan juruaudit disiasat menggunakan model regresi logistik. Hasil
kajian menunjukkan bahawa penggantian juruaudit oleh firma-firma tersenarai sebahagiannya
diterangkan oleh perubahan dalam pengurusan dan pertumbuhan perolehan. Perubahan dalam
ciri-ciri firma seperti pertumbuhan aset, pembelian aset tetap kepada jumlah aset, kemampuan
mempengaruhi orang lain dan perubahan dalam aktiviti kewangan menerangkan penggantian
juruaudit. Hal ini menunjukkan tiada bukti kesan harta signifikan daripada pengumuman
penggantian juruaudit.
ABSTRACT
This article examines the economic rationale for auditor change by Malaysian listed firms by
examining audit switch effect on share prices. The auditor change decision by management to
retain or to change involves a switch across audit firms with different quality. Audit quality is
defined by classifying the audit firms into Tier 1 (Big-5) firms and Tier 2 (non-Big 5) firms. The
distinguishing attribute between the two groups of audit products is believed to be the credibility
that each group brings to the audit engagement. Factors associated with the choice of audit firm
and changes for firm characteristics associated with auditor choice were investigated using the
logistic regression model. The findings show that the auditor switch of Malaysian listed firms is
partly explained by changes in management and turnover growth. Changes in firms' characteristics
such as asset growth, purchase of fixed asset to total asset, leverage and changes in financing
activities explain auditor switches. There appears to be no evidence of significant wealth effect
from auditor switch announcements.
INTRODUCTION of financial reporting and cost of monitoring
Accounting literature on auditor change decision management activities is well documented in the
and its implications on firm's value, credibility literature emanating from the developed
countries. Auditor switch decision involves
The first author expresses his gratitude to Universiti Pulra Malaysia for providing the financial grant and scholarly assistance
through qualified supervisors to complete this major study as his Ph.D thesis. He wishes to record his appreciation to the
reviewers of this paper for selecting this as the best paper for the award of the first prize at Malaysian Finance Association
meeting in May, 2000. The authors jointly thank the anonymous reviewers for their decision to accept this paper in the
proceedings.
Huson Joher, M. Ali, Shamsher M., Annuar M.N. &: M. Ariff
change of incumbent auditor resulting in the
choice of quality differentiated audit firms to
realign the characteristics of the audit firm with
the growing needs of clients under changing
circumstances. Changes in management,
perceived expertise of audit firms and
deterioration of financial health of clients have
been found to be associated with auditor change/
switch decisions. Changes in a firm's activities
and perception of advances in audit technology
have been shown to be associated with the choice
of quality differentiated audit firms.
Changes in management might result in
replacement of the incumbent auditor with a
view to imbibe fresh ideas to enhance the firm's
expansion policy under a changed management.
Similarly, auditor replacement will be initiated if
the existing audit firm lacks the expertise to
keep up with the firm's expansion policies and
its changed internal control systems. Firms
experiencing consistent deterioration in
performance may also decide to replace the
incumbent audit firm with a more compliant
auditor in an attempt to evade a qualified report
detrimental to the value of the firm.
Change in firm's activities (expansion,
contraction, financing, performance, etc.) and
audit technology creates demand for the choice
of quality differentiated audit firms. The rationale
for choosing a relatively higher quality audit
firm might be due to the growing needs of the
firm, to take advantage of the audit firm's
reputation. The choice of a lower quality audit
firm might be prompted by a sudden contraction
of business activities, to gain an ability to
negotiate audit comments to reflect
management's view rather than an unsolicited
"fair view" as well as a desire to lower costs of
engaging audit services.
Due to asymmetry of information between
principals and management, management of
growing firms might redirect resources, as
pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits on the
job, at the expense of shareholders. The
shareholders have to incur costs to ensure that
management's activities are consistent with
shareholders' objectives. Management of highly
levered firms might be tempted to transfer wealth
from their shareholders by engaging in risky
investments beyond that sanctioned by
shareholders. Engaging relatively higher quality
audit firms mitigates against these agency costs
elements of management but which are
ultimately borne by shareholders.
Revaluation effect of auditor switch has been
an issue of interest among investors and unlike
corporate dividend and earnings announcements,
which reflect a real change in expected corporate
performance, auditor change announcements
convey no direct apparent economic information.
The economic effect from the latter event is the
signal associated with different investors'
interpretation about the quality of audit services
provided by the auditor. Investors are observed
to utilise the auditor change/switch
announcements to revise their expectation of
the firm's expected future cash flows, and hence
its share prices. A change to higher prestige
auditors might be perceived as an improvement
in audit services and hence an expected positive
revaluation effect may result. Similarly, a change
to lower prestige audit firms might be perceived
as negative news. Evidence (Nichols and Smith
1983; Eichensher et al 1989) suggests that larger
audit firms provide higher quality audit services
by offering greater credibility to clients' financial
statements than the small audit firms.
Though there is substantial documentation
on determinants and revaluation effect of auditor
switch announcements in developed markets,
there is a hardly any documented evidence on
similar issues in developing markets, like
Malaysia. This research examines the
determinants and the revaluation effect of
auditor change announcements of firms listed
on the KLSE. Section 2 presents literature on
the economic rational for auditor switch. Section
3 provides discussion on methodology and data
collection. Section 3 is further divided into test
model, abnormal returns measures and statistical
tests. Section 4 provides discussion on findings
for simple parametric test, logistics regression
and event study methodology. The final section
summarises the findings of the paper.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The theory of the firm as amended to include
Agency Problem emphasises the importance of
monitoring management activities. Jensen and
Meckling (1976) suggest that auditing is one
monitoring device that can mitigate agency costs,
implying a need for independent audit services.
Based on Watts and Zemmerman's (1978) work,
DeAngelo (1981a; 1981b) developed a demand
and supply rationale for audit quality. Audit
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quality is defined as the probability that an
auditor will both discover the breach of contract
(material mis-statement) and subsequently
actually report it. It is implied that auditors
specialise in supplying various level of audit
quality and audit firm size is an effective surrogate
for audit quality. Firms change their auditors to
ensure a desired quality of audit service.
An analogy from product differentiated
hypothesis is that firms use auditor choice as a
signalling device to reveal their desirable
characteristics. Investors incorporate the arrival
of new information (choice of quality auditor)
and re-evaluate the firm's value. Investors are
willing to pay a relatively higher price for better
performing firms. Holthausen and Verrecchia
(1990) suggest that firms appear to signal their
ex ante uncertainty by hiring a higher prestige
audit firm to perform their audit. This signal is
credible to the market since the auditor's
compensation is higher exhibiting firm-specific
reputation capital. Firms with unfavourable
information would prefer a lower quality auditor.
The literature on auditor change
documented in the developed markets offers
several explanations for factors affecting both
switching and its affect on share revaluation.
Early work on these issues by Burton and Robert
(1967) and Carpenter and Strawser (1971)
provide evidence on the determinants of auditor
switch decisions. They documented a positive
relationship from changes in management,
changes in new financing and switching auditor.
Qualified audit reports are important in
determining auditor switch. Managers
strategically use switch decisions to avoid any
unfavourable information release to investors
(Chow and Rice 1982; Crawswell 1988; Dye 1991;
Citron and Tafler 1992). However, the findings
of Gul et al (1991) and Takia et al (1993) did
not support this notion. Other factors include
the demand for additional audit service (Burton
and Robert 1967; Lurie 1977), firms* growth
(Lingbeck and Rogow 1978), financial distress
(Schwart and Menon 1985; Dhaliwal and
Schwartzberg 1993), and the importance of audit
fee to corporate management decision
(Bedingfield and Loeb 1974; Ettredge and
Greenburg 1990).
There is evidence of a significant relationship
between firm size, growth and choice of auditor
(Healy and Lys 1986; Johnson and Lys 1986;
Simunic and Stein 1987). In general, firm size
increases contribute to agency costs since it
creates a vast opportunity for managers to
consume non-pecuniary benefits thus resulting
in a demand for a quality audit firms (Tier 1)
(Fama and Jensen (1983a; 1983b)). Alternatively,
Johnson and Lys (1986) argue that fixed
investment in the auditor error detection
technology leads to specialisation in market
segment and difference in technologies and cost
function across market segments are likely to be
reflected by difference in audit firm's size
(Francis and Wilson 1988). Palmrose (1984),
Eichenseher and Shields (1986), Johnson and
Lys (1990) showed a positive association between
leverage and choice of Tier 1; negative association
for Tier 1 audit firms which underwent merger
activities (Healy and Lys 1986). Healy and Lys
also assert that clients who issue new debt
securities remain with Tier 1 audit firms to take
advantage of its reputation and thereby lower
investors' information costs in assessing the
investment quality. Francis and Wilson (1988)
provide support for an hypothesised association
between agency costs and choice of brand name
after controlling for growth and client size.
Evidence of market reaction on auditor
switch decision is inconclusive. Fried and Schiff
(1981) examined the disclosure requirement by
SEC and the degree of market reaction to such
disclosures surrounding the auditor changes.
The findings suggest a negative effect on average.
The literature offers several explanations for
negative revisions in stock prices, which, among
others include, substantial direct and indirect
cost associated with auditor switch and investor
perception of poor economic prospect of firm's
operating, financing and performance. Dupuch
and Simunic (1982) suggest that firms switching
to higher prestige audit firms will yield a positive
response while switching to lower prestige audit
firms will have negative response from market
participants.
Smith and Nichole (1982) documented a
dispute over accounting and auditing principles
with auditors prior to the auditor switch and
those of client firms which did not disclose any
dispute. A systematic price decline was reported
surrounding the auditor switch for a client firm
which reported a dispute with the auditor.
Johnson and Lys (1990) examined the
market reaction to voluntary auditor changes
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and reported no price reaction. Davidson and
Gribbin (1995) documented a negative abnormal
return to the announcement of auditor change
and postulated that it might be due to the
market's lack of confidence about the motive
for the change. John et al (1999) showed a
negative market reaction to auditor resignation
and suggested that auditor resignation from
office is likely to be a cost signal for audit firms
particularly when a client firm is a listed company.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
One hundred and thirty-five firms that switched
their auditors over the period 1986 to 1996 were
sampled. The complete data set for all analysis
was available for 108 firms. The sample was
verified using annual reports and announcement
dates for auditor changes were obtained from
the minutes of the annual general meeting. The
revaluation effect of auditor switch was analysed
using stock prices and Composite Index values
extracted from the daily diary of KLSE.
Following Zurada et al (1998), the logistic
regression model is used to analyse the decision
to change, retain auditor or (switch to higher
or lower prestige audit firms). This model avoids
normality assumptions when the dependent
variable is dichotomous and produces highest
classification accuracy for the traditional
dichotomous response variables. The functional
form of a logistic cumulative density function:
P (Y= 1IX) = exp (XPk Xk)/[l+exp(5:pk Xk)]
(1)
The unknown parameters (a, p) are
estimated using Maximum Likelihood Estimators
(MLE) in contrast to ordinary regression models
which are estimated by the method of Least
Squares Estimators (OLS). Since the likelihood
equations for logit equations are non-linear in
the parameters to be estimated, algebraic
solutions are not obtainable and therefore
approximation by standard iterative algorithms
is used.
Test Model
Parametric Test
The parametric test of the differences in the
mean value of the characteristics of sampled
firms (firms changing their audit firms) and
control firms (client firms that did not change
their audit firms) was conducted. The
characteristics are turnover, average asset,
acquisition, of fixed asset return on asset, leverage
and liquidity position of the firms. A similar test
was also conducted to examine the difference
among client firms associated with quality
differentiated audit firms.
Auditor Change Model
The stepwise logistic regression technique was
selected to ascertain the important determinants
of audit switch decision. The functional form of
the regression equation is as follows:
(2)
Z= A with A = 1 or 0 indicating that a client firm
did (1) or did not switch auditors (0). X = the
variables identified for the model. These are
management change (MGTCH), average
acquisition of fixed asset to total asset (ACQUI),
turnover growth (GROWTH) both prior and
after the auditor switch, liquidity (LIQ), firms
leverage (LEV), average returns on asset (AROA),
average earnings per share (EPS), qualified audit
report both prior and after the auditor switch.
Change in management could serve as
principal-agents contractual arrangement as new
management could demand for the replacement
of an incumbent auditor with a new one with
whom it has favorable dealings in the past and
who will bring new ideas that is instrumental to
the firm's expansion policy. This is measured by
taking value of one if there is a change in
management or zero otherwise. Rapid growth
could be a measure of principal-agent contract.
Clients who are constantly acquiring subsidiaries
and expanding into new markets would demand
new auditors who are more effective in
discharging auditing service. Rapid growth is
measured by percentage changes in turnover
growth three years prior and three years after
the auditor switch. Auditor effectiveness is
measured by the size of the audit firm, that is
whether the audit firm is a member of higher
prestige auditor or otherwise prior to the auditor
change. This measured by taking the value of
one if pre-switch audit firm was a member of
higher quality (Tier 1) audit firm or 0 for
otherwise. Client firms whose reputation is
tarnished by its poor performance, corporate
management will try to change auditors to avoid
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any unfavourable information disseminated to
the capital market. A qualified report, average
return on asset, average earnings per share and
liquidity of the firms are used as proxy for
client's reputation. Qualified audit report is a
binary variable which takes the value of 1 if
auditor issued qualified report one or two years
prior to or after auditor switch or otherwise. An
operational variable such as audit fees takes the
value of 1 if there is a reduction in audit fee
subsequent to auditor switch or otherwise.
Auditor Choice Model
The analysis of the firms' characteristics and the
direction of auditor changes (Tier 2 to Tier 1
audit firms and vice versa) are done using logistic
regression model. Previous studies (Johnson and
Lys 1990; Francis and Wilson 1988) used similar
models to determine the characteristics of the
firms which are associated with direction of the
auditor changes. The hypothesised relationship
may be expressed as follows:
(3)
where
Y = 1 indicating firms switching to higher
prestige (Tier 1) audit firms and 0 indicates
firms switching to less prestige (Tier 2) audit
firms.
X. = predictor (independent) variables, and
(Aj, Xr \v...,Xk): the coefficient of the predictor
variables.
Variable Measurements
The frequently used variables to proxy for the
firm's change in activities over time are asset
growth, asset size, turnover growth, changes in
acquisition, firm's leverage, changes in financing,
changes in operating cash flow, and average
returns on asset.
Expansion: Expansion entails increasing in
scope, geographical dispersion and volume of
client's activities. The corresponding increase in
quantity and complexity of accounting
transactions results in economies for larger
auditors, which provide high quality audit service
(De Angelo 1981). The expansion or contraction
is proxied by four operational variables namely
annual growth in total assets three years prior to
and three years after the switch: it is indicated as
GRTHB and GRTHA respectively. Changes in
average acquisition of fixed to total asset is
abbreviated to CHACQ and annual growth of
sales prior to the switch is abbreviated to
TURNGRTHB. Therefore, the larger the size of
the client's growth, the greater the demand for
the services of larger audit firms.
Financing: The operational variable to proxy
financing is estimated from newly issued debt
and equity ratios measured as "Long term debt
+ Equity)/Total Asset" abbreviated to CHFA.
Firms that change to larger audit firms are
predicted to exhibit a higher level of post-audit
changes in financing compared to ones that
change to smaller audit firms (Johnson and Lys
1990). We expect a positive correlation between
a firm's financing activity and the choice of
higher prestige audit firms.
Profitability: The profitability of the firm is
measured by two operational variables: average
returns on asset (AROA) and average cash flow
(ACFL). If poor returns and cash flows are
exhibited prior to the event, client firms are
likely to change to smaller audit firms. Therefore,
the profitability prior to the auditor change
should be positively correlated with auditor size.
Audit Risk: The audit risk relates to the
probability of an auditor issuing unqualified
opinion on materiality of mis-stated financial
statements. It is difficult to measure audit risk
objectively and accurately. No single proxy for
audit risk is considered adequate. However, it
appears to be related to client's business risk
(Simunics and Steins 1987). The business risk is
proxied by two operational variables namely,
client firm's size (SIZE) measured by total assets
and leverage (LEVR) both prior to and after
auditor changes. An increase in client size entails
a wider geographical dispersion and scope;
therefore clients need the services of larger
audit firms that have competitive advantage over
the smaller firms. Higher leverage client firms
would pose higher levels of financial risk,
therefore, it is likely that firms with higher risk
will engage the services of larger audit firms that
have greater expertise to analyse the situation
resulting in greater credibility to the reports.
Market Model
The standard Market Model (Sharpe 1964) is
used to estimate the expected returns and
average excess returns. The model expressed as
follows:
Rt = a + Pj Rmt + u t (4)
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where
x 100
c - c x 100
Rt : the rate of return of the ith stock on the
period t
Pu : stock price i at period t
PU1 : stock price i at period t-1
D.t : Cash dividend paid to the shareholders
a : the constant average return while market
yields zero returns
P : beta estimate
D.t : Residual or random noise term assumed
to have property of Uk~ (o\a2)
Rmt : the rate of returns on the market portfolio
(Composite Index) for period t Ci and
Ct { are the values of Composite Index at
period t and t-1.
To estimate the parameters of the market
model, 60 monthly observations from outside
the analysis period (event window) are used to
avoid any misestimates of the market return
around the event dates. Market Model
parameters are adjusted for non-synchronous
trading problem caused by thin trading using
Scholes and Williams (1977) two lag and two
leads model.
Abnormal Returns Measures
Abnormal returns or residual returns are
prediction errors. The abnormal returns for a
given share price at any time period is the
difference between the actual returns and the
expected returns.
u t = R - (a + (3Rrn) (5)
The average excess returns are:
AR = 1/N 1 U
N : number of sample companies across the
sub-sample
AR t: average abnormal returns for companies
at period t
If ARl > 0 and statistically significant, it
indicates that the market on average reacts
positively to the event and thus increases the
wealth of the shareholders. To observe the
cumulative effect, cumulative abnormal returns
(CARs) were calculated by summing up the ARt
over various time periods of interest:
+K
CAR = S ARt
-K
(6)
where
CAR
 K t = is the cumulative abnormal returns
for cut-off point over the window
period from K to L,
-K,...+K refer to event window surrounding
auditor changes.
Statistical Tests
Individual Coefficient Estimates
To measure the relationship between the
exogenous variables, X, and dichotomous
response variable, individual estimate is tested.
Thus this test statistics is defined as
Where the Sk is the standard error of the
coefficient and Bk is the coefficient of the
individual variable in the model.
Goodness of Fit Test
In normal regression analysis, F statistics can be
used to test the joint hypothesis that all
coefficients except intercept is zero. A
corresponding test in logistic regression that
serves the same purpose is based on Likelihood
Ratio. The functional form of Likelihood Ratio
is as follows:
where
In I <P) is the value of the likelihood^ function
for full (unrestricted) model and l($*) is the
maximum value of the likelihood function if all
coefficients except the intercept (restricted), are
zero.
The method produces a statistics that follows
approximately a Chi-square distribution with k-1
(k being the number of independent variables)
degree of freedom if the joint null hypothesis is
true. If the alternative hypothesis were to be
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accepted, XLR becomes larger. If null hypothesis
is to be accepted, XLR < %2
RESULTS
Differences in Characteristics of Switch and Non-
switch Firms
Table 1 presents the test results on the
characteristics of client firms that switched their
auditors and those of control firms that did not
switch their auditors over a period of five years
(2 years proceeding and 2 years after the auditor
switch). These are based on mean differences
respectively for (a) size, (b) turnover growth, (c)
returns on assets, (d) leverage of the firms, (e)
acquisition of fixed asset to total asset and finally
the liquidity position of the two groups. A simple
parametric test was used to observe the
differences in the firm's characteristics associated
with switch and non-switch groups. The results
suggest that both switch and non-switch groups
are distinctly different from one another in a
number of dimensions. For instance, the turnover
growth of firms that switched their auditors is
significantly larger than those that did not switch
auditors over the same period. The mean values
of the turnover growth over the 5-year (two
years prior and two after the auditor) period for
the two groups were recorded as 130 percent
and 70 percent, respectively. Meanwhile, the
average return on assets (ROA) of the two groups
over the same period is 3.4 percent for firms
that switched their auditors and 5.1 percent for
non-switch firms, though not statistically
significant (t-value = -1.4). The observed
differences on average acquisition of fixed assets
to total assets registered a marginally higher rate
for firms that switched auditors, for example,
the average acquisition of the two groups was 7.5
percent and 6.1 percent respectively. The
differences on asset sizes, leverage and liquidity
of the two groups were small and not significant
at the conventional level.
Determinants of Auditor Switch
To provide an objective framework, the variables
for the determinants of auditor switch were
derived from agency theory and others in the
accounting literature. These are turnover growth
(TGROWTHB) prior to auditor switch and after
(TGROWTHA), average acquisition of fixed
assets to total assets (ACQ), return on assets
(ROA), average earning per share (EPS), change
in audit fees (AUDF), management change
(MGTCHG), audit report both prior (RPORTB)
and after (PRORTB) the switch, firms leverage
(Leverage), liquidity of the firms (LIQ) and
audit type (AUTYPE)
Table 2 presents the results of the logistic
regression model explaining the determinants
of auditor switch firms. Initially 13 variables
were analysed using maximum likelihood
estimation procedure in stepwise logistic
regression based on centred data. In initial step,
stepwise regression identified GROWTHB,
GROWTHA, MGTCHG AND ROA as significant
variables. However, in the final step, the
procedure selected only three variables
(GROWTHB, GROWTHA, and MGTCHG)
which met the 0.10 and 0.05 levels of significance
for inclusion in the final model. The chi-square
value for overall model was 25 with 3 degrees of
freedom (significant at the .0001 level). Based
on the findings in Table 2, the joint null
hypothesis (that is, all the slope coefficients are
simultaneously zero) cannot be accepted. The
results support the notion that auditor switch
decisions of listed firms in Malaysia are mainly
determined by management change, and
turnover growth both prior and after auditor
change. The coefficient of the explanatory
Simple parametric test
Characteristic
Size (RM)
Sale growth
ROA
Leverage
Liquidity
AvAcq
TABLE
for mean difference
Mean Switch
617890 (000)
1.30
.034
0.4325
1.82
.075
1
between switch and
Mean Non-switch
558508 (000)
,70
.051
0.4221
1.76
.06
non-switch sample
t-value
0.28
1.736*
-1.451
0.309
.259
.78
* Marginally significant at 10 percent level
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variables are consistent with theory and findings
as reported in Burton and Robert (1967),
Linbeck and Rogow (1978) and Takiah et al
(1993). Burton and Robert document a
significant association between change in
management and replacement of new auditor.
Consistent with Takiah et al (1993) in the
Malaysian context, this study could not establish
any significant relationship between qualified
opinion and subsequent auditor switch. It also
confirms the conclusion drawn by Takiah et al
(1993) that having profit or losses over the years
does not necessarily influence the switch of
auditor in Malaysia.
It must be noted that though qualified audit
opinion was most strongly associated with auditor
change in the US (Chow and Rice 1982),
Australia (Craswell 1988) and Hong Kong (Gul
et al 1991), it is not a significant determinant of
auditor change in Malaysia, Similarly, the findings
could not establish any significant relationship
between audit fee and change in audit firm,
inconsistent with documented findings
(Eichenseher and Shields 1983); Bedingfield and
Loeb 1974).
Changes in Firm's Characteristics and Choice of Audit
Firms
Table 3 summarises the descriptive statistics for
firms that switch to Tier 1 audit firms and those
that switch to Tier 2 audit firms. The results are
for mean differences of the following variables:
turnover growth, asset size, growth of asset,
leverage, returns on assets, financing activities
and average acquisition to total assets. There are
some noticeable differences. The average
turnover growth of firms that switched to Tier 1
auditor are comparatively higher than firms that
switched to Tier 2 auditor recording 54 percent
and 45 percent respectively, 2 years preceding
the auditor change.
Meanwhile, the average asset growth before
the auditor change for firms that switched to
Tier 1 audit firms is higher than firms that
switched to Tier 2 audit firms, recording at 50
percent and 42 percent respectively. And the
TABLE 2
Regression results on determinants of auditor switch
Vars p-value Model specification Percent
MGTCHG
TGROWTHB
TGROWTHA
.05**
.07*
.012**
Ch-Square
Classification rate
Prediction Rate
Switch Group
Non-Switch Group
25.00**
64.00
72.00
51.43
Characteristics Mean Mean
(p=.000)
significant at 5 percent level. * significant at 10 percent level.
TABLE 3
Test of differences between switch to tier 1 and switch to tier 2 firms
t-value
Turnover growth before
Size before ('000)
Size after
Asset growth before
Asset growth after
Leverage before
Leverage after
ROA before
Financing before
Financing after
Acquisiticn before
.5455
624624
1108536
.506
.597
.4436
.4436
.041
.452
.421
.07938
.45
144632
316577
.418
.58
.3496
.37
.05
.489
.40081
.0539
.27
2.52*
2.35*
.3117
.049
1.7**
1.6
.455
-.529
.393
1.565
* 5 percent significant level
**10 percent significant level
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size of the asset for client firms that switch to
Tier 1 are significantly larger than firms that
switched to Tier 2 audit firms. The average
acquisition before the auditor switch is recorded
at 7,9 percent for firms switching to Tier 1 audit
firms and 5.39 percent for firms that switched to
Tier 2 audit firms. Furthermore, firms that
switched to Tier 1 auditor exhibited higher
leverage than those that switched to Tier 2 audit
firms, significant at 10 percent over. The return
on assets for firms switching to Tier 2 audit firms
is higher, registering 5 percent over those
switching to Tier 1 audit firms recording 4.1
percent, but not statistically significant at the
conventional level. This finding suggests some
significant differences in the characteristics of
firms that switched to Tierl and Tier 2 auditor
firms respectively.
Table 4 summarises the results of changes
in firm's characteristics and choice of auditors
using logistic regression. Initially asset size, asset
growth, turnover growth, return on assets, change
in operating cash flow, leverage, change in
financing activities and changes in acquisition
were included in the analysis.
The stepwise procedure retained 4 variables
(LEVA, CHFA, GRTH, CHACQ which are
statistical signal) in the analysis. The results
indicate that the choice of auditor exhibits a
significant positive association with changes in
financing activities, leverage after the auditor
changes, and growth in assets before the switch,
while a significant negative association is reported
for change in acquisition. Though asset size for
client firms that switched to Tier 1 significantly
differs from client firms that switched to Tier 2
audit firm, the regression analysis fails to exhibit
a significant association between asset size and
audit choice. It is only significant at 21 percent
level. The coefficients of the variables are
consistent with theory except for turnover growth.
The negative coefficient for change in average
acquisition demonstrates that firms that switch
to Tier 1 auditor exhibit a higher level of average
acquisition to total asset during the pre auditor
change period compared to the post period,
consistent with the summary findings in Table 2.
The significant positive coefficient for
leverage after choice of auditor indicates that
higher leverage firms pose a higher level of
financial risk and increases in agency cost of
debt. To allow for this possibility, client firms
would engage the services of high quality (Tier
1) audit firms, who have greater expertise to
analyse the situation and give greater credibility
to the financial reporting than a small audit firm
would. Meanwhile, evidence of a positive
relationship between changes in financing
activities and choice of Tier 1 audit firms showed
that firms switching to Tier 1 audit firms exhibit
a higher level of post-auditor change financing
to increase the marketability of new securities
(both debt and equity). Furthermore, the
documentation of positive relationship between
firms' asset growth and choice of auditor suggest
that rapid growth entails substantial increases in
traction volume and accounting complexity, and
decentralisation of financial controlling system
thus requiring the services of larger audit firms
presumably having the expertise to provide
specialised services. The large audit firms do
have a cost competitive advantage over smaller
audit firms.
The summary results show that the average
acquisition for firms that switch to Tier 1 auditors
are relatively higher than firms that switched to
Tier 2 auditors, although the average acquisition
tends to decline for former group in the post-
switch period. Thus the joint-hypothesis (all the
slope coefficients are simultaneously zero) can
TABLE 4
Result of the logistic regression analysis
Variables p-value Model specification Percent
CHACQUI
CHFA
GRTHB
LEVA
TURNGB
SIZEB
.008
.03
.024
.048
.288
.221
Chi-Square
Classification Rate:
Overall
Switch to Tierl
Switch to Tier2
17.4
81.2
95.8
44.4
1
 significant at 5 percent level
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be rejected with a chi-square value of 17.46 with
a 6 degree freedom (p=. 0069). The model
correctly classifies for 81.2 percent. Earlier
studies on auditor choice have documented
inconsistent results on the association between
clients' characteristics and direction of auditor
change. The findings of this study are more
consistent with the hypothesis that firms that are
expected to raise debt financing demand the
services of high quality auditors to monitor
management activities that are detrimental to
the bondholders. The leverage was hypothesised
to be positively associated with the choice of
Tier 1 by Palmrose (1984), Eichenseher and
Shield (1986). The findings of a positive
coefficient for the change in financing activities
after the auditor change indicates that firms
which are expecting to issue securities in the
near future demand the services of Tier 1
auditors to attest credibility to the financial
reporting to market participants. This is
consistent with the findings of Carpenter and
Strawser (1971). They asserted that firms may
change auditors especially from a Tier 2 to Tier
1 auditor to increase the marketability of the
new securities (debt and equity issue). Consistent
with the study of Johnson and Lys (1990), this
study also documents asset growth before and
after auditor change, change in financing
activities and change in acquisition as the major
determinants of choice of auditors. However,
contrary to Johnson and Lys (1990), this study
documented a negative association between
change in acquisition and choice of auditor.
The finding of negative coefficient indicates that
pre-switch acquisition for clients firms that switch
to Tier 1 audit firms is comparatively higher
than clients firms that change to Tier 2 audit
firms.
The Wealth Effect of Auditor Sioitch Decision
Table-5 summarises the average abnormal returns
(ARs) and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs)
around the announcement day over a window of
81 days. Average daily excess returns and
cumulative abnormal returns were examined for
statistical significance using standard test
procedure.1 Findings indicate that auditor
change on average are not associated with
significant price adjustments in Malaysia. Average
abnormal returns on the day of announcement
itself and the 3-day (-1 to +1) excess returns are
0.092 percent and 0.0461 percent respectively.
These are not statistically significant. The
cumulative abnormal returns over the days (-60
to -8) and (-8 to -1) are 0.018 and 0.62 percent
respectively. Post-announcement CAR over the
days (1 to 8) and (8 to 20) are 0.43 percent and
0.25 percent respectively. However, none are
statistically significant at the conventional level.
The client firms that switched to higher
(lower) quality audit firms experienced positive
excess returns at day zero of 0.12 percent and
0.69 percent respectively. The 3-day (-1 to +1)
excess returns for firms that switched to lower
quality audit firms recorded -0.29 percent.
However these are not significant at the
conventional level. The pre-announcement CAR
for client firms that switched to higher quality
audit firms over the days (-8 to -1) recorded a
net gain of 2.25 percent with a t-value of 1.84.
However, the CAR at post announcement period
over the days (1 to 8) and (8 to 20) declined,
recording cumulative abnormal returns of
percent and -2.00 percent respectively. But none
are statistically significant.
Market on average reacted negatively to
client firms that switched to a lower quality
auditor. The CAR over the day (-60 to -8)
recorded a cumulative 0.12 percent, which is
not statistically significant. However, pre-
announcement CAR over the days (-8 to -1)
recorded a net loss of 4.56 percent, which is
marginally significant at 10 percent level. CAR
in post-announcement period over the days (1
to 7) and (8 to 20) recorded a net gain of 1.68
percent and 0.13 percent respectively. However,
these are not statistically significant at the
conventional level.
The revaluation of auditor change type
within classes is more ambiguous and there is no
clear-cut direction of price changes. However,
overall it appears to suggest a common stock
price decline surrounding the auditor change.
The average abnormal returns on the day of
announcement and three days (-1 through +1)
excess returns for client firms that switched from
higher prestige to higher prestige audit firms
1. t-AR = ARt-0/SE(AR), t-CAR=CARia/SE (CAR^), where SE(AR) = standard error of AR and SE(CAR)
CAR and (K.L) = cut-off point from K to L during window period
standard error of
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TABLE 5
Market reaction to auditor switch announcements
Trading day
-10
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
A
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
CAR
(-60 to -8)
(-8 to -1)
(1 to 7)
(8 to 20)
Full sample
AR
0.00146
-0.00147
0.00019
-0.00392
0.00210
0.0054*
-0.00073
-0.00019
0.00390
-0.00065
0.00228
0.00095
-0.00042
-0.00087
-0.00213
0.00340
0.00503
-0.00119
-0.00040
-0.00302
0.00038
0.00018
0.00618
0.0043
0.0025
Tier 2-Tier 1
AR
-0.00296
-0.00053
0.00311
-0.00247
0.00781
0.00686
-0.00045
0.01151
-0.00093
-0.00415
0.00116
0.00016
0.00022
-0.00484
-0.00326
0.00474
0.00514
-0.00329
-0.00611
-0.00306
-0.00347
.0595*
.0225*
0.00002
-0.0288
Teirl-Tier 2
AR
-0.00294
-0.00812
-0.014**
-0.01710
-0.00365
0.01126
-0.019**
-0.02414
0.021**
0.00005
0.00690
-0.00431
-0.00600
0.00078
0.00794
-0.00509
0.022**
0.00202
-0.00072
-0.00536
0.00575
0.00117
-0.04568*
0.0168
0.00132
Tier 1-Tier 1
AR
-0.00275
-0.00126
-0.00034
-0.00182
0.00015
-0.00173
-0.00380
0.00186
0.00034
-0.00291
-0.00161
0.00111
0.00180
0.00133
-0.00597
0.00548
0.00403
-0.00001
0.00820*
-0.00556
0.00371
-0.031
-0.0098
0,0078
0.0168
Tier 2-Teir 2
AR
0.00392
-0.00344
-0.01363
0.00713
0.01354
-0.00436
0.02316
-0.00629
-0.00480
0.00132
0.00014
-0.00295
-0.01657
0.0128*
-0.00999
-0.02116
0.01335
0.00385
-0.00621
0.00227
0.00479
-0.0358
0.00462
-0.02062
-0.04628
* significant at 10 percent level
** significant at 5 percent level
recorded at -0.161 percent and -.34 percent
respectively. These are small and insignificant.
The CAR over the days (-60 to -8) and (-8 to -
1) recorded a loss of 3.1 percent and .98 percent
respectively, which are not statistically significant.
The revaluation effect of auditor change from
Tier 2 to Tier 2 reported a weak negative market
reaction. Though significant positive and negative
abnormal returns were reported, none of the
day zero and three-day (-1 to+1) excess returns
were significant, recording at 0.014 percent and
-0.034 percent respectively. The CAR over the
day (-60 to -8) and (-8 to -1) registered a
cumulative return of -3.5 percent and 0.46
percent respectively for the Tier 2 to Tier 2
switch sample. CAR during the post
announcement recorded over the (1 to 8) and
(8 to 20) were -2.06 percent and -2.5 percent
respectively. However these findings are not
statistically significant.
To substantiate existing literature, further
analysis was done to determine whether firms
belonging to different levels of financial
condition, and switched audit firms resulted in
different market reaction. The financially healthy
firm that switched audit firms resulted in a
positive market reaction while financially
unhealthy firms that switched audit firms resulted
in a significant negative reaction surrounding
the auditor changes. For financially healthy firms,
the ARs for the day of announcement and 3-day
(-1 to +1) excess recorded at -0.5 percent and -
0.03percent respectively. Pre-announcement
CAR over the days (-60 to 8) and (-8 to -1)
registered a net gain of 0.63 percent and 1.53
percent respectively, but these are statistically
insignificant. Post-announcement CAR over the
days (1 to 8) and (8 to 20) were at 1.09 percent
and -1.15 percent respectively. While CAR for
financially unhealthy firms that switched auditors
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over the (-60 to -8) and (-8 to -1) recorded a
net loss of 15,8 percent and 1.4 percent
respectively. These are not statistically significant
at 10 percent level.
The revaluation effect of auditor change for
client firms that received a clean opinion
reported a weak positive market reaction
surrounding the auditor change. The ARs for
announcement day and 3 days (-1 to +1) were at
0.16 percent and .009 percent respectively. The
pre-switch CAR over the days (-60 to -8) and (-
8 to 1) are recorded as net gains of 1.5 percent
and 0.25 percent respectively. But none are
statistically significant. The post-switch CAR over
the interval (1 to 20) reported a net gain of 0.11
percent. This is apparently consistent with Teoh's
(1992) contention that firms will experience a
positive reaction after a clean opinion than
qualified opinion, because high value retention
is more common after clean than qualified
opinion. But none are statistically significant.
Judging from the market reaction to auditor
changes, there is weak evidence that the market
indeed perceives auditor change as a signal.
Thus, auditor switch in this emerging capital
market conveys information value associated with
auditor change, but due to unknown reasons,
are not producing the significant effect normally
reported in some developed markets. The
demonstration of weak positive market reaction
reflects that an increase in firm value appears to
occur, and it is not a negative market reaction
documented in earlier literature from the
developed markets. Observing significant
cumulative abnormal returns for client firms
that switch to Tier 1 audit firms prior to auditor
change reflects a confirmation of quality shift
also observed in other markets.
CONCLUSION
The issue of auditor has been of interest to
academics, researchers and industry experts due
to its strategic implication for firm value,
credibility of financial reporting and monitoring
costs to curtail agency costs. Despite the concerns
shown in developed economies, little attempt
appears to have been made in Malaysia to
examine such an important issue in this fast
growing economy. Thus, this paper is a modest
first attempt that ascertains the determinants of
auditor switch decision and its effect on share
valuation of firms listed on the Kuala Lumpur
Stock Exchange. Logistic regression and event
study methods were used to analyse the data.
In general, findings appear to suggest that
auditor switch in Malaysia is determined by
changes in management and higher turnover
growth. Changes in firms* characteristics such as
asset growth prior to auditor switch, changes in
average acquisition of fixed assets to total assets,
firm's leverage, and changes in financing activities
were found to be significantly associated with
choice of quality differentiated audit firms.
Auditor change in general is not associated
with any significant price adjustment coinciding
with the announcement of auditor switch, despite
a positive trend in upvaluation of such firms.
However, once portfolios were formed based on
the auditor change types, different results
emerged. Firms that switched to higher quality
audit firms experienced positive (though weak)
market response while negative reaction is
observed for firms that switched to lower quality
audit firms. The revaluation effect from shifts
within classes exhibits weak negative abnormal
returns. An interesting difference in the findings
of this study and those of similar studies reported
in developed economies is that there is a weak
positive abnormal market reaction anomalous to
those reported in the developed economies.
This could be due to the positive development
at firm's level and significant upsurge in the
Malaysian economy, which had registered average
GDP growth of 8-9 percent over the test period.
Alternatively, there are some still unknown
missing variables confounding the results.
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ABSTRAK
Dengan perubahan pantas dan persaingan yang begitu hebat di persekitaran, peranan sistem
kawalan pengurusan di sesuatu organisasi dalam penyediaan maklum balas maklumat kepada
pihak pengurusan untuk mengawas keberkesanan dan kesesuaian strategi persaingannya untuk
mencapai matlamatnya menjadi lebih mustahak. Kajian ini meninjau cara penggunaan pelbagai
kaedah kawalan pengurusan dan kesepadanan kaedah kawalan ini dengan keutamaan atau
orientasi persaingan firma-firma. Satu soal selidik disediakan dan dikirim secara rawak kepada 250
organisasi di Lembah Klang. Sebanyak 93 borang soal selidik dipulangkan dan dianalisis.
Keputusan kaijian ini menunjukkan bahawa pada keseluruhannya, organisasi-organisasi berpendapat
persaingan berasaskan harga, kualiti, dan perkhidmatan/promosi keluaran mereka adalah lebih
hebat dibandingkan dengan persaingan berasaskan kepelbagaian dan inovasi keluaran. Selaras
dengan pendapatan mereka ten tang kehebatan persaingan, keutamaan atau orientasi persaingan
mereka juga lebih menumpukan kepada persaingan berasaskan harga rendah, kualiti atau
perkhidmatan yang tinggi dan kurang menumpukan kepada kepelbagaian dan inovasi keluaran.
Penggunaan di antara kawalan perakaunan dan amalan pengurusan moden untuk mengawas,
menilai dan mengawal aktiviti organisasi adalah lebih kurang seimbang, kecuali terdapat kawalan
kewangan melalui perbandingan prestasi sebenar dengan belanjawan luas digunakan. Perusahaan
kecil menubuhkan sistem kawalan pengurusan secara kurang formal dan mereka juga tidak
begitu mementingkan penggunaan kaedah kawalan pengurusan jika dibandingkan dengan
perusahaan besar. Bukti ketidaksepadanan penggunaan sebahagian kaedah kawalan pengurusan
ditandakan dalam kajian ini. Implikasi keputusan kajian ini dibincangkan.
ABSTRACT
With the rapidly changing and increasingly more competitive environment, the role of a
management control system (MCS) in an organization in providing information feedback to
management for monitoring the effectiveness and appropriateness of the organization's competitive
strategy to achieve its goals is becoming more important. This study examines the extent of usage
of various management control measures and the compatibility of these control measures with the
competitive priorities or orientations of firms. A structured questionnaire was prepared and
randomly sent to 250 organizations in the Klang Valley, A total of 93 usable responses were
analyzed. The results show that organizations, generally, perceived competition based on product
price, quality and service/promotion to be more intense than that based on product variety and
innovation. Consistent to their perceived intensity of competition, their competitive priorities or
orientations also stressed more highly on competition based on low price, high quality and
service, with a much lower emphasis on wide product variety and product uniqueness. Except for
an apparent pervasive high usage of the "budget vs. actual" financial control measure, there was
a fairly balanced usage of accounting-based controls and modern management practices for
monitoring, evaluating and controlling the organizational activities. Small enterprises tended to
adopt less formal management control systems and had less extensive usage of the various control
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measures than the large firms. Evidence of a lack of proper alignment or incompatibilities in the
usage of certain management control measures was indicated in this study. The implications of
the findings are discussed.
INTRODUCTION
The advancements in information technology
and the imminent trend towards trade
liberalization (or globalization) have significantly
changed the environment in which businesses
now operate and intensified competition in the
market place. As a consequence, new competitive
strategies are being formulated and
organizational structures, as well as the related
monitoring and control systems, are continuously
modified to support the new strategies. In the
past when business environment was relatively
stable and competition was minimum, the
management control system (MCS) was designed
to rely heavily on accounting or cost information
to monitor and control cost efficiency of daily
operating activities. The traditional management
accounting control system with its high emphasis
on accounting and cost control measures,
generally, loses its robustness when the business
environment becomes less stable and more
uncertain (Otley 1980). Management control
system has to play a more strategic role in the
current rapidly changing and highly competitive
business environment. Its major role is to
effectively monitor the organization's strategy
implementation and progress, and to provide
information feedback on the appropriateness of
the existing strategies for attainment of the
organization's goal(s). There is evidence that
business enterprises, which match their internal
structures and control systems with their
strategies, may achieve high performance
(Govindarajan and Gupta 1985; Chenhall 1997).
Empirical evidence on the effects of strategy
on management control systems or how these
control systems influence strategy and specifically,
how top management could organize and use
the control systems to assist the attainment of
the corporate goals or objectives, is still scarce
(Simons 1990). In fact, empirical studies on this
issue only began to emerge in the 1990s
(Langfield-Smith 1997).
With the growing interest in the relationship
between management control system and
strategy, the definition of management controls
has been broadened to encompass both the
accounting-based and non-accounting-based
controls that are instituted for the attainment of
long-term strategic goal(s) of an organization.
Most of the literature on the effect of strategy
on the design of management control system or
vice versa has been normative in nature (Miles
and Snow 1978; Porter 1980; Miller and Friesen
1982). Relatively few studies have examined the
empirical relationships between corporate
competitive priority or orientation and usage of
management control measures or practices in
the lesser-developed economies, like Malaysia1,
Besides, the existing empirical evidence on the
relationships between strategy types and
management control system attributes, and
environmental characteristics is generally limited,
mixed and inconclusive (Sim and Teoh 1997;
Langfield-Smith 1997). With the impending
threats arising from globalization of the market
place, management of business enterprises must
take heed of the need to design the "right"
management control systems to manage their
emerging strategies for competitive advantage in
the new environment (Simons 1990). This is
especially critical for firms in the lesser-developed
countries due to their relative disadvantages in
both financial resources and human skills. A
proper matching of management control system
and competitive strategy is necessary to enable
the management of an organization to obtain
the relevant information feedback to gauge the
appropriateness of its corporate competitive
strategy and to use the formal control feedback
processes to modify its existing strategy. This
study aims to provide some empirical evidence
1 Chung (1996) and Sim and Teoh (1997) examined the relationships between management control system attributes
and business strategy type based on Miles and Snow's (1978) categorization. Chung's study focused on the
electronics and electrical firms in Singapore; while Sim and Teoh's study was a comparative study of Australian,
Singapore and Malaysian firms. This study differs from these two studies in that the current study examines for
evidence of compatibility or incompatibility between a firm's competitive priority or orientation and its usage of
management control measures or practices.
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on the extent of usage and compatibility of
management control measures or practices in
relation to the competitive priorities or
orientations of firms in Malaysia.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The growing interest in the relationship between
management control system and strategy arises
from the awareness that environment and strategy
are important determinants of the management
control system used in an organization. To
illustrate the need to modify the traditional
control system when environment changes,
Hoque and Hopper (1994) provided empirical
evidence, which suggests that the standard costing
systems and variance analysis are ineffective and
irrelevant in times of environmental uncertainty.
The traditional type of management control
system design, very often, is used as organizational
defensive routines to protect and continue
existing practices, regardless of changes in the
environment. The traditional device of
monitoring performance using financial budgets
may not only be ineffective, but also may even
be "anti-learning" (Argyris 1990), when budgets
or standards are made easily achievable to cover
up fundamental problems and to continue past
inefficiencies. The accounting-based control
system, however, can be designed to play a
significant integrative role to resolve internal
conflicts and facilitate flow of pertinent
information, such as relevant product costing
data and benchmarking information on
competitors' relative performance, to arouse
awareness of impending external threats and
drive the need for organizational change.
Earlier research studies focus the nature
and role of management control systems in
different organizational types. Miles and Snow
(1978) provided descriptions of control system
attributes of organizations following a defender-
like strategy and those of organizations following
a prospector-like strategy. Due to the stable
environment that a defender firm is expected to
operate in, its control system is typically
characterized by centralized decision-making with
formalized job descriptions and standard
operating procedures. A defender firm adopts a
competitive pricing strategy and hence,
emphasizes heavily on cost controls and other
efficiency matters. Porter (1980) also suggested
that tight cost controls were appropriate for
firms, which followed a cost leadership strategy.
In contrast, a prospector firm tends to have a
flexible structure to enable it to respond rapidly
to changes in its environment. Jobs in a
prospector firm are normally broadly defined
and standard operating procedures are often
few in order to encourage innovation. Control
in a prospector firm tends to be decentralized
and the firm is very much results oriented.
Similarly, Porter (1980) associated firms, which
were pursuing the differentiation strategy, to
heavy reliance of control through coordination,
rather than on formal accounting-based controls,
to encourage creativity and innovation. Chung
(1996) found that defender firms and prospector
firms placed different emphasis on control system
attributes and his results were congruent with
results of studies in other cultures. However,
Sim and Teoh (1997) reported that several
environmental and control system attributes
differed by national context in their discriminant
functions that was used to classify firms into the
three Miles and Snow's (1978) strategic
categories.
Research interests later were extended to
studies that examined empirically for systematic
relationships between specific attributes of the
management control system and a particular
corporate strategy. Daniel and Reitsperger (1991)
examined on how the management control
systems of Japanese automotive manufacturers
and consumer electronics companies were
modified to complement and support their total
quality or zero-defect strategy. They found that
managers adhering to zero defect strategy were
more frequently provided with information
feedback on achievement of quality goals, rejects
and downtime than those managers, who were
only adhering to economic conformance level.
This finding supports their proposition that the
corporate strategy that focuses on continuous
improvement and reduction of defective units
has to be complemented by frequent feedback
on achievement of the combined goals to foster
effective quality improvements. The competitive
inroads experienced by Japanese automotive and
consumer electronics firms in the global market
may be a consequence of the consistency or
alignment between their strategy on product
quality and their management control system's
attributes. This is in accord with the claims by
Hiromoto (1988) that Japanese management
accounting systems are designed to influence
employees to behave in accordance with the
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corporate long-term strategic goals, rather than
to keep accurate product cost information. In
another study by Ittner and Larcker (1997), who
examined management control practices in the
automotive and computer industries in Canada,
Germany, Japan and the United Sates, it was
found that quality-related strategic control
practices tended to be used more extensively in
organizations that followed quality-oriented
strategy than organizations with different strategic
orientations. However, their hypothesis that
organizations, which have aligned their strategic
control practices more closely to their competitive
strategies, achieve higher performance only has
mixed support. The effects of some strategic
control practices on performance were found to
vary with industry and several strategic control
practices even exhibited negative relationships
with performance. Perera, Harrison and Poole
(1997) also found support for a significant
association between customer-focus strategy and
the use of non-financial performance measures,
an attribute of management control system.
However, they too found that the performance
of organizations that pursued customer-focus
strategy was not significantly linked to an
increasing use of non-financial performance
measures. The lack of a significant relationship
between corporate performance and
management control attributes might be due to
the lagging effect and limitation of using a
point-in-time measure for organizational
performance.
Khandwalla (1972) provided the first
empirical evidence of the relationship between
management control systems and level of
competition, a critical determinant of the nature
of strategy adopted by an organization. He found
a strong positive relationship between the
intensity of competition and reliance on the
formal accounting control systems. Although,
his study did not explicitly consider the nature
of strategy adopted by organizations, but it is
implicit that organizations that face intense
competition are likely to adopt strategies of a
prospector (Miles & Snow 1978) or a
differentiator (Porter 1980). In view of that,
Langfield-Smith (1997) opined that the formal
accounting controls examined in Khandwalla's
study were not those consistent with the
prospector type of organizations that emphasized
on flexibility and innovation, and hence, implying
that Khandwalla's study did not consider the
compatibility of those controls in supporting a
particular strategy or level of competition. Several
other empirical studies (Chung 1996: Mak 1989),
however, provided evidence that was consistent
with Khandwalla's study. Prospector firms were
found to be associated with more sophisticated
and frequent use of operational controls,
including cost controls, than the defender firms
because of the greater uncertainties faced by the
prospector firms.
The increasing competition and the
accelerating technological changes have led to
the establishment of more flexible organizational
structures to facilitate rapid responses to changes
in market demands. The change is necessary
because the traditional hierarchical
organizational structures that focus on
bureaucracy and activities by individual
departments or units tend to dampen employees'
initiatives and innovations (Bartlett and Ghoshal
1993). The management control systems in the
new organizational models that have
incorporated a greater level of employee
empowerment and a flatter or network
organizational structure are expected to play an
integrative role that focus on the contributions
and interrelationships of units within those
organizations. Modern management practices,
such as total quality management, business
processes re-engineering, employee
empowerment, cross-functional work teams and
adoption of non-financial performance measures,
are increasingly being adopted to complement
the traditional accounting-based controls, to meet
the serious challenges posed by the uncertainties
and turbulence in the external environment.
The flatter organizational structure and an
enhancement in employee empowerment have
made the traditional hierarchical responsibility
center reporting system less necessary. Non-
financial performance indicators, such as those
suggested in the balanced scorecard concept
(Kaplan and Norton 1992), are increasingly being
incorporated to complement the traditional
financial performance indicators to effectively
assess the performance of the critical success
factors of organizations
The earlier studies provided empirical
evidence that firms in the more developed
countries generally adapted their management
control practices to changes in their corporate
strategies. Most of the control measures
examined were, however, accounting-based
94 Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. Vol. 8 No. 2 2000
Alignment of Management Control System to Corporate Competitive Orientation: Some Empirical Evidence in Malaysia
controls. This study examines empirically the
relationships between types of control practices
(both accounting-based and modern
management practices) and competitive priorities
or orientations of firms in Malaysia. The findings
would provide further empirical evidence on
the adaptability of management control practices
to changes in the competitive orientations of
firms in the lesser-developed country like
Malaysia.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Data Collection
A structured questionnaire was prepared and
pre-tested on several practising managers to
ensure clarity of terms used. Two hundred and
fifty copies were sent to managers and executives
of a randomly selected sample of organizations
located in the Klang Valley. A total of 93 (37.5%)
completed and useable questionnaires were
returned and analyzed.
The questionnaire was divided into three
sections: Section A requested for background
information on the organization and the
respondent, Section B focused on the attributes
of the organization's management control system
and the extent of usage of those control measures
or practices; Section C required a respondent to
rate, on a 5-point Likert scale, the perceived
intensity of five different types of competition
faced by his or her organization and
consequently, their perceived importance of the
corresponding five types of competitive priorities
or orientations.
The types of competition examined in this
study were based on the three of types of
competition in Khandwalla's (1972) study, except
that Khandwalla's product competition was
further segregated into product quality, variety
and innovation. With this modification, the five
types of competition examined in this study
were product price, quality, variety, innovation
and service/promotion. The competitive priority
or orientation in this study was defined as a
firm's emphasis in its competitive strategy to
achieve its competitive advantage and this is
conceptually similar to Khandwalla's measure of
importance of each type of competition to a
firm's profitability. Each of the five types of
competition was related to a competitive priority
or orientation. For example, when a firm
perceives a high intensity of competition in price,
it is expected that the firm would place a high
priority (or orientation) in formulating a low
product price competitive strategy. A total of
twelve management control measures or practices
were listed2. Six of the management control
measures or practices were accounting-based
controls, such as use of financial budgets,
standard cost variances and discounted cash flow
techniques; while the other six were modern
management control practices, such as total
quality management, business process re-
engineering, employee empowerment and inter-
departmental work-team.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Profiles of Respondents and Organizations
The profiles of respondents and their
organizations are summarized in Table 1. About
88.6% of the participating organizations were
incorporated enterprises or limited companies.
All limited companies in Malaysia are required
legally to comply with stringent record-keeping
and corporate disclosure or governance
regulations. Most of the participating firms
(46.2%) were from the manufacturing sector
with services sector firms constituted 34.4% of
the sample and more than two thirds of the
organizations were Malaysian-owned enterprises.
As for the respondents, more than 60% of the
respondents held middle or senior management
positions and about 90% of the respondents had
either tertiary or professional qualification.
Perceived Intensity of Competition and Competitive
Priorities or Orientations
The mean rating scores (and standard deviations)
of the perceived intensity of the five types of
competition, as well as those for the perceived
importance of the corresponding competitive
priorities or orientations are presented in Tables
2 and 3, respectively. On overall, the respondents
perceived competition in product quality to be
most intense and consistently, they rated
producing high quality product to be their most
2 The control measures or practices were adopted from measures used in Khandwalla's study as well as those modern
management practices discussed in the management literature. Respondents, however, were also allowed to state
other management control practices used in their organizations.
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TABLE 1
Profiles of respondents and organizations
Position held:
Senior management level
Middle management level
Junior management level
Age:
< 30 years
30 -45 years
> 45 years
Qualification:
Tertiary
Professional
Others
Industrial Sector:
Manufacturing
Services
Others
Number of Employees:
< 100
100 - 500
>500
Ownership:
Local
Foreign
18.2%
44.3%
37.5%
37.2%
56.4%
6.4%
52.7%
37.4%
9.9%
46.2%
34.4%
19.4%
30.9%
45.7%
23.4%
69.8%
30.2%
important competitive priority or orientation. As
can be seen from Table 3, the correlation
between the intensity of each type of competition
and importance of the corresponding
competitive priority or orientation was highly
significant ( p < 0.001), except that for the
product service and promotion competitive
priority or orientation.
TABLE 2
Mean rating scores and standard deviations of
perceived intensity of the five types of competition
Type of Competition Mean
Rating
Score
Standard
Deviation
Product Quality 4.48 0.70
Product Price 4.05 0.94
Product Service & Promotion 3.90 1.12
Product Uniqueness 3.82 1.07
Product Variety 3.66 1.11
Scale: l=very low; 5= very high
Analysis of the perceived intensity of
competition by industry type generally shows the
similar ranking as that in Table 2 for the
manufacturing and the services sectors. Firms in
the "other" sector, however, ranked intensity of
price competition to be more intense than
product quality. The firms in the "other" sector
included several commodity-type firms, such as
firms in the plantation sector and oil and gas
sector. Despite of their higher perceived intensity
of competition on price, firms in the "other"
sector were, however, consistent with firms in
the manufacturing and services sectors in ranking
producing high product quality as their most
important competitive priority. Local-owned firms
perceived competition in product service/
promotion to be more intense than the foreign-
owned firms (4.07 vs. 3.61; F=2.987; p=0.088).
Generally, the rating scores of the large firms
for both the perceived intensity of each type of
TABLE 3
Mean rating scores, standard deviations and correlations of perceived importance
of five competitive priorities or orientations
Competitive Priority or Orientation
High Product Quality
Good Customer Service & Promotion
Low Product Price
Wide Product Variety
High Product Uniqueness
Mean
Rating
Score
4.61
4.17
3.87
3.85
3.74
Standard
Deviation
0.73
0.90
1.02
1.17
1.17
Correlation with
the Corresponding
Intensity of
Competition
0.516**
0.166
0.66**
0.703**
0.522**
Scale: l=very unimportant; 5=very important
** significant at 0.01
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competition and the perceived importance of
the corresponding competitive priority were
higher than those of the small firms. However,
the differences were not statistically significant.
Management Control Measures or Practices
The twelve control items were classified into
either accounting-based controls or modern
management control practices. Items 1 to 6 in
Table 4 were the accounting-based controls; while
items 7 to 12 were the management control
practices. The average of the mean scores of the
six accounting-based controls3 was higher than
that for the management control practices4 (3.20
vs. 3.00). A closer analysis of the mean scores in
Table 4, however, indicates that there was a
fairly balanced usage of accounting-based
controls and modern management control
practices, except for an apparent pervasive high
or extensive usage of the budget vs. actual control
measure, which was the only control measure
with a mean rating score above 4.00. Besides
budget vs. actual, there were two other accounting-
based controls, namely Internal Audit and
Responsibility Reporting, with mean rating scores
above 3.00; while in the modern management
practices category, there were four measures,
namely empowerment, inter-departmental work team,
TQM and non-financial measures, with mean rating
scores above 3.00. This finding suggests that the
firms, as a whole, are using a combination of
accounting-based controls and non-accounting
modern management practices to monitor and
control their operations, as suggested in the
management literature.
TABLE 4
Mean rating scores and standard deviations of management
control measures or practices
Type of Control Measure or Practice Mean Rating
Score
Accounting-Based Controls:
1. Budget vs. Actual
2. Internal Audit
3. Responsibility Reporting
4. Flexible Budgeting
5. Standard Cost Variances
6. Discounted Cash Flow Techniques
Modern Management Practices:
7. Inter-departmental Work Team
8. Empowerment
9. Total Quality Management (TQM)
10. Non-Financial Measures
11. Business Process Re-engineering (BPR)
12. Economic Order Quantity (EOQ)
Overall Accounting-Based Controls
Overall Management Control Practices
3.20
3.00
Scale: l=very low; 5=very high
Standard
Deviation
4.08
3.34
3.29
2.89
2.87
2.64
3.31
3.31
3.06
3.04
2.69
2.61
1.03
1.27
1.16
1.16
1.17
1.26
1.10
0.87
1.14
1.14
1.11
1.24
0.74
0.75
3 The measure of the overall accounting controls was a composite measure, which was computed based on the mean
rating scores of the six accounting-based controls. The reliability analysis of this overall measure showed a Cochran's
alpha of 0.7041.
4 The measure of management control practices was a composite measure, which was computed based on the mean
rating scores of the six management control practices. The reliability analysis of this overall measure showed a
Cochran's alpha of 0.7642.
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Relationships Between Competitive Priorities or
Orientations and Management Control Measures
or Practices
The results of the correlations between the
management control variables and competitive
orientations are summarized in Table 5 and they
indicate a few instances of lack of proper
alignment or incompatibilities as discussed below.
Low Product Price Competitive Orientation
Firms with a high priority for low product price
as a competitive strategy are expected to
emphasize highly on accounting-based controls
to manage cost efficiency. Contrary to
expectation, the correlation coefficients in Table
5 show that firms with high competitive priority
or orientation for low product price were
associated with low usage of four of the five
accounting-based controls, namely discounted cash
flow techniques, internal audity standard cost variances
and responsibility reporting. Budget vs. actual was
the only accounting-based control that was
positively correlated to low product price orientation
and even then the association was not statistically
significant. These firms with a high priority for
low product price were also associated with low
usage of all of the five modern management
control practices. The association of low product
price competitive priority with the overall usage
of modern management control practices was
negative and significant (r = -0.197; p< 0.05).
The two specific modern management practices
that exhibited significant negative relationships
were business process re-engineering (BPR) and inter-
departmental work-teams. BPR is used in activity
analysis to eliminate non-value added activities
to improve cost efficiency and yet this approach
was seemingly "unpopular" with firms whose
competitive priority was to compete based on
cost efficiency.
High Product Quality Competitive Orientation
Firms with a high priority for product quality are
expected to be positively associated with usage
of Total Quality Management (TQM). This study
found a positive association between priority for
product quality and usage of TQM, but the
relationship was not statistically significant. The
overall association between this product quality
orientation and the extent of usage of
accounting-based controls and that of modern
management control practices were positive, but
not statistically significant.
Wide Product Range and Product Uniqueness
Competitive Orientations
Firms with a high priority for either wide product
range or product uniqueness are likely to be the
prospector type of organizations that emphasize
on flexibility and innovation. Table 5 shows that
these firms were significantly associated with a
high usage of control practices, irrespective of
whether accounting-based controls or modern
management practices. The finding of a highly
significant association with flexible budgeting
measure suggests that firms with high priority
for wide product range or product uniqueness
are aware of the need to constantly revise their
budgets to reflect changes in the environment.
A high emphasis on budget vs. actual in
performance evaluation, however, could
influence managers to favour short-term profits
at the expense of long-term competitive
advantage. The highly significant association
between firms with product variety or innovation
orientation and usage of discounted cash flow
techniques for evaluating investment project
proposals in these firms may also be incompatible
with the notion that the traditional financial
appraisal techniques are inappropriate for
appraisal of certain strategic investment projects,
which are very long-term in nature and whose
future economic benefits are difficult to predict
or ascertain. The need to satisfy the conventional
financial criteria under discounted cash flow
techniques often result in radical innovations being
unfairly inhibited and discouraged (Finnie 1998).
Good Sales Service & Promotion Competitive Orientation
Firms with a high priority for good sales service
and promotion, generally, exhibited positive
associations with usage of both the accounting-
based controls and modern management
practices. The significant negative association
with usage of inter-departmental work team suggests
that firms with a high priority for good sales
service and promotion may be still very
hierarchical in their setups. The criticism for the
traditional hierarchical structure is that its
bureaucracy delays decision-making process and
as a consequence, the firm is not likely to be
very responsive to changes in customers' needs.
Inter-departmental work team aims to facilitate
decision-making by having team members from
various functional areas to jointly respond to the
changing demands of the markets.
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Non-Price Competitive Orientation
A composite measure of non-price competition
orientation5 was computed based on the mean
rating scores of the four non-financial competitive
priorities or orientations. This measure was used
as a surrogate measure of firms pursuing the
differentiation strategy (Porter 1980). The results,
as shown in Table 5, indicate a highly significant
association between non-price competitive
orientation and usage of both the accounting-
based controls (p < 0.01) and the modern
management control practices (p < 0.05). Firms
with non-price competitive priority or orientation
exhibited a significant usage of accounting-based
measures like budget vs. actual, discounted cash
flow techniques and internal audit, while also
emphasized significantly on modern
management control practices like business process
re-engineering and economic order quantity. These
findings are consistent with those in the earlier
studies by Mak (1989) and Chung (1996), which
reported that prospector firms (similar to
differentiator firms) had a more extensive usage
of controls due to their relative high
environmental uncertainties.
The correlat ion between the overall
perceived intensity of competition and the overall
usage of management control measures was not
significant, but the correlation between the
overall intensity of non-price competition and
overall usage of control measures or practices
was highly significant (p < 0.01). This suggests
that firms, which have a high level of perceived
intensity of competition on no-price dimension,
tend to have a high or extensive usage of
management control measures or practices to
TABLES
Pearson correlations between competitive orientations and management control measures
Competitive Orientation
Management Control
Measure or Practice
Low High Wide Product Product Non-price
Product Product Product Uniqueness Promotion competition
Price Quality Range / Service
1. Budget vs. Actual 0.072 0.039 0.268** 0.134 0.189* 0.242*
2. Discounted Cash Flow
Techniques -0.07 -0.045 0.265** 0.25** 0.174* 0.222*
3. Internal Audit -0,031 0.002 0.176* 0.175* 0.157 0.212*
4. Standard Cost Variances -0.086 0.067 0.199* 0.137 0.149 0.163
5. Responsibility Reporting -0.134 -0.037 0.107 -0.021 -0.153 0.017
6. Flexible budgeting -0.103 0.025 0.211* 0.247* 0.033 0.173
7. Total Quality
Management (TQM) -0.095 0.108 0.166 0.175* 0.141 0.202
8. Business Process
Re-engineering (BPR) -0,258** 0.076 0,30** 0.363** 0.171* 0.341**
9. Economic Order Quantity
(EOQ) -0.039 0.054 0.227* 0.171 0.126 0.216*
10. Non-Financial Measures -0.137 0.015 0.044 0.055 -0.076 0.042
11. Inter-departmental Work
Team -0.187* 0.153 0.044 0.062 -0.193* 0.065
12. Empowerment -0.115 0.143 0.073 0.143 -0.04 0.107
Overall Accounting-Based
Controls -0.095 0.011 0.321** 0.245* 0.183 0.268**
Overall Management
Control Practices -0.202* 0.13 0.215* 0.238* 0.057 0.242*
Overall Control Usage -0.161 0.077 0.291** 0.263* 0.135 0.277*
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed)
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)
5 Its Cochran's Alpha was 0.7378.
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monitor performance. This finding is partly
consistent to that reported in Khandwalla (1972),
who found a significant positive relationship
between overall competition and the overall
usage of controls with price competition having
the least impact on usage of controls and product
competition showing the greatest impact. He
attributed that to the increasing expected net
benefits from application of controls as
competition intensified and the increase in
expected net benefits was more evident with
increasing product competition. This study did
not find an overall significant positive
relationship between overall intensity of
competition and usage of controls because of
the negative relationship between intensity of
price competition and overall usage of controls.
From the analysis by type of competitive
priority or orientation, the apparent lack of
proper alignment or incompatibilities may be
summarized as follows. Firms with a high
competitive priority for low product price did not
exhibit an extensive or high usage of accounting-
based controls. Even though firms with a high
competitive priority or orientation for high product
quality did exhibit a positive association usage of
TQM, the relationship was not statistically
significant. Firms with high competitive priorities
for wide product range and product uniqueness used
extensively some accounting-based controls that
might inhibit creativity and innovation. Despite
of the trend towards a greater employee
empowerment and greater usage of non-financial
measures to monitor the critical success factors
of firms pursuing product differentiation strategy
(Porter 1980), the usage of employee
empowerment and non-financial measures were
not significantly related to any of the non-price
competitive priority or orientation.
Further analysis indicated that size had a
significant influence on the usage of the
management control measures. The large
enterprises had a significantly more extensive
overall usage of control measures (F=3.677;
p=0,029) than the small enterprises. The
difference in usage of accounting-based controls
between the large and small enterprises was
highly significant (F=3.399; p=0.038). This might
be because the large enterprises, which were
likely to be incorporated businesses, are required
to establish more formal accounting control
systems to comply with the existing financial
reporting and disclosure requirements. The
difference in the usage of modern management
control practices between the large and the
small enterprises, was, however, only moderately
significant (F=2.779; p=0.067).
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
With the impending threats from globalization
of the market place, businesses have to become
more agile and responsive to the rapid changes
in customers* needs. Competition based on non-
price dimension is becoming more prevalent as
trade barriers are being removed. Product life
cycle is also becoming shorter and shorter, as
more and more competitors enter the market.
Hence, business enterprises are placing
increasing emphasis on speed and responsiveness
to satisfy the rapid changing needs of the market
place, and on innovation to replace the rapid
demise of their existing products and services.
This study examines the perceptions of
organizations on the intensity of five types of
competition and their competitive orientations
or priorities in response to their perceived
intensity of the different types of competition.
The results of this study indicate that the
organizations were competing mainly based on
product price, quality and service. Product
uniqueness or innovation and wide product
variety were rated as the lowest and the second
lowest, respectively, in their list of competitive
priorities. This observation is disturbing because
survival in the new environment depends very
much on the ability of a firm to innovate and
extend its range of goods or services to the
increasingly sophisticated and demanding buyers
in the market place. This study also found
evidence of a lack of proper alignment or
incompatibilities between the use of control
measures and certain competitive priorities or
orientations. Firms with a high priority for low
product price were found not to place high
emphasis on accounting-based controls to
manage their cost efficiency. Firms with a high
competitive priority or orientation for producing
high quality products were also not significantly
associated to those with a high or extensive use
of TQM and this is not in accord with the
findings in the more developed countries, such
as that reported in Ittner and Larcker (1997).
The use of non-financial measures and employee
empowerment was not significantly related to
any of the non-price competitive priorities or
orientations.
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The finding of a lack of proper alignment
or incompatibilities between usage of type of
control measures and certain competitive
priorities or orientations of firms suggests that
there may be deficiencies in the design of
management control systems in these firms and
as a consequence, managers in these firms may
not be able to effectively utilize the formal control
processes to coordinate and control their
operating activities to achieve competitive
advantages, as intended in their firms*
competitive strategies. The current study,
however, is unable to identify the causes for the
lack of alignment or incompatibilities, except to
provide some empirical evidence of the extent
of alignment in the usage of management
controls to firms* competitive priorities or
orientations. With the imminent trend towards
globalization, the apparent lack of proper
alignment may be detriment to these firms'
abilities to formulate the appropriate strategies
to compete with other world-class players.
Management literature has stressed on the
importance of a strategic fit in the designing
their management control systems and these
control systems have to be modified when strategy
changes in response to environmental changes.
Unfortunately, management control systems
often remain unchanged even though
competitive strategy might have already been
changed, resulting in incompatibilities as those
observed in this study. Although Khandawalla
(1972) opined that firms were still far from
designing optimal control systems, he, however,
reckoned that accountants could help the design
of better control systems with proper
quantification of the intangible costs and benefits
of controls. In order for the designers of
management control systems to be able to
evaluate the effectiveness of various control
measures, there must be effective
communications between the formulators of the
new strategy and the designers of management
control systems to avoid any strategic
misalignment. This is in accord with Simons
(1990) who advocated the interactive
management control processes, whereby a firm's
competitive strategic positioning, management
control measures and process of strategy
formulation influence one another as the firm
evolves and adapts over time, to manage and
align management controls to the emerging
strategy. The implementation of an effective
interactive management control process requires
a more open communication structure and freer
flow of information within the firm.
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ABSTRAK
Unit amanah saham merupakan skim pelaburan yang diuruskan oleh pengurus atau organisasi
dana dengan menawarkan pelbagai portfolio kepada pelabur. Jangka masa pelaburan biasanya
bergantung kepada matlamat amanah saham itu sendiri. Memandangkan ia melibatkan jangka
masa pemegangan yang panjang dan mendatangkan kesan berlipat-ganda, perbezaan kadar
pulangan tahunan yang meskipun kecil juga amat merugikan pelabur. Oleh yang demikian,
pernilaian terperinci diperlukan terhadap pencapaian amanah saham di samping pengurus dana
sebelum perjanjian dibuat. Seperti yang diketahui bahawa kadar pulangan yang tinggi pada satu
tempoh tunggal boleh mengelirukan jika kajian terhadap kemudahubahan pulangan pada masa
lampau tidak diambil kira. Walaupun kaedah risiko pulangan terlaras digunakan untuk
menyelesaikan masalah ini, namun hanya merupakan analisis ukuran pencapaian yang "snapshot"
sahaja. Analisis Snail Trail telah diperkenalkan untuk menyelesaikan kelemahan ini dan
memberikan gambaran yang lebih menyeluruh terhadap pencapaian para pengurus dana.
Kajian ini mengambil kira 17 buah ekuiti pertumbuhan dana. Analisis Snail Trail menunjukkan
kedua-dua amanah saham Asia Progress dan KLMF Growth telah memperlihatkan kemajuan dari
pencapaian pulangan tinggi berisiko tinggi dan pulangan rendah berisiko rendah kepada
pencapaian tinggi berisiko rendah. Sementara, tiga buah dana didapati berada di bawah paras
purata seperti yang ditunjukkan oleh gambar rajah Snail Trail. Ketiga-tiga dana ini terdiri
daripada BHLB High Growth, KLMF Industry dan KLMF Aggressive Growth. Pencapaian dana-
dana telah merosot prestasi sepanjang masa kini dari pulangan tinggi berisiko rendah kepada
pulangan rendah berisiko tinggi. Empat buah amanah saham yang terdiri daripada SBB Premium
Capital, HLB Growth, OSK Equity and RHB Capital pula menunjukkan pencapaian risiko-
pulangan dana yang tekal.
ABSTRACT
Unit trust is an investment scheme that offers investors a well diversified portfolio managed by
a professional fund manager or organisation. The investment horizon is medium to long term
depending on the stipulated objective of the unit trust. Due to the long holding period and
compounding effect, a slight difference in the annual rate of returns can be very detrimental to
the investor. Therefore the performance of a unit trust as well as the fund manager must be
carefully evaluated before committing to the fund. As we know, a high rate of returns in a single
period can be very misleading if we do not study the volatility of the historical returns. Risk
adjusted returns offer a solution to this problem, but this is only a "snapshot" performance
measurement analysis. Snail-Trail analysis was introduced to overcome these drawbacks and
better portray the dynamic history of fund manager's performance.
17 equity growth funds were selected for the purpose of this study. From the snail-Ttrail
analysis, two promising unit trusts were found to be Asia Progress and KLMF Growth. Both funds
have shown improvement in relative performance from the "high return high risk" and "low
return low risk" quadrant moving up to "high return low risk", the most favourable, quadrant.
Meanwhile, three funds have been classified as below average as the snail trail diagrams shown
deteriorating performance. These three funds are BHLB High Growth, KLMF Industry, and
KLMF Aggressive Growth, the performance of which has been falling rapidly over recent years,
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from the "high return low risk" quadrant to "low return high risk" quadrant. Four unit trusts
showing the most consistency in fund risk-return performance are SBB Premium Capital, HLB
Growth, OSK Equity and RHB Capital.
INTRODUCTION
Unit trust is an investment vehicle that pools
money from investors and the pooled fund will
then be invested in a diversified portfolio. The
fund will be managed by professional fund
managers or asset management organisations on
behalf of unit trusts investors. Investors can
select the unit trust based on their investment
objectives, investment strategy and risk tolerance
level.
In the selection process, besides the above
mentioned investor characteristics, the relative
performance of the unit trust also plays an
important role. Here comes the question: what
do you refer to when you want to know the
performance of a particular fund? We used to
refer to the "league table" showing various unit
trusts ranked according to their returns, or the
advertisements which highlight the impressive
high rates of return over the last "xM months or
years.
A high rate of returns in a single period can
be very misleading if we do not study the volatility
of the historical returns. Therefore the risk-
return tradeoffs must be studied. A diagram
with standard deviation of the returns on the
horizontal axis as a proxy for risk and the rate of
return on the vertical axis can be plotted. This
diagram is a step forward and allows explicit
risk-return tradeoffs to be made. This traditional
risk-return diagram presents a single or static
snapshot in time over a set period. As discussed
in Balzer (1991), to further improve the diagram,
multiple points, each representing a set of risk-
return for a specific period can be plotted on
the same diagram. This diagram portrays a
dynamic history of a single fund manager's
performance. However, this presentation is
useful only to show how a fund manager's
performance has varied over time. It fails to
reveal how much of that performance is due to
the manager's unique skill and how much is due
to fortuitous market movements enjoyed by most
managers.
A very good indication of the skill
component can be obtained by constructing a
relative risk-return history, where the median
risk and median return (for an appropriate
universe of fund managers) are subtracted from
the results. This process highlights a manager's
value-adding and risk-reduction skills relative to
its peer group.
Unlike the traditional risk-return diagram,
the snail trail approach not only shows results
relative to the median or average fund manager,
but is a robust tool for comparing fund managers'
performance.
METHODOLOGY
The relationship between risk and returns can
be graphically illustrated. Relative return is
plotted on the vertical axis and relative risk is
plotted on the horizontal axis.
The first point on the risk-return graph is
plotted as usual. The beginning and end points
of the period are then rolled forward by one
quarter and the return and risk for the new
period are calculated and plotted on the same
graph. By repeating this process, a trajectory is
traced out dynamically in risk-return space.
After the compound average annual returns
over the period (4 quarters) are calculated, the
median returns for the same period for the
universe of pooled funds are svibtracted to give
the relative returns.
To measure risk, there are a number of
alternative computations. As in Grinblatt et al
(1994) and Woodward (1983), the most
commonly accepted measure of risk, standard
deviation of returns, has been chosen for these
analysis. The standard deviation of quarterly
returns over the period is calculated and
annualised using the standard -*4 factor (which
implicitly assumes a random walk stochastic
model for the return series). The relative risk is
then calculated by subtracting the median
standard deviation for the group of fund
managers and is plotted on the horizontal axis.
It is important to note that the horizontal
axis is not the standard deviation of the relative
returns, but the relative standard deviation of
the total returns. Use of the former would show
how well a particular fund manager tracked the
median. This might or might not be a useful
measure depending on one's purpose. A low
figure would simply indicate that the manager
has nicely tracked the median, which itself might
be undesirably volatile. On the other hand, a
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low figure for relative standard deviation, as
defined in this paper, implies low volatility of
returns in the absolute sense, which is clearly
desirable.
After the first point is plotted, the period is
rolled forward one quarter and the calculation
is repeated. One of the major advantages of the
above rolling approach is that, all results are
revealed — good or bad. The performance
figures used in this paper are "after fee**.
Fairly obvious, desirable above median
returns appear above the horizontal median
return line and less-desirable below-median
results appear below it. Similarly, below-median
volatility appears on the left of the diagram and
above median volatility on the right. The most
desirable region is on the top left "high return
low risk" (HL) quadrant, while the least desirable
is the bottom right "low return high risk" (LH)
quadrant.
Irrespective of the absolute position of a set
of points on the graph, the tightness of their
grouping is a direct indication of the consistency
of a manager's risk-return performance.
Seventeen unit trust funds were selected for
the purpose of this study. These funds are
categorised as growth and equity fund in Chong
(1999). These funds are from EPF approved
unit trust companies. Only funds with more
than 100 million units in circulation will be
included. By definition, a growth fund
concentrates on investing in securities with
growth potential. Growth may come in the form
of the invested company's growth or expansion,
and capital appreciation. Growth fund, also known
as equity fund, invests mainly in shares traded on
the stock exchange. Equity funds can be made
up of local shares, shares of unlisted companies,
or shares listed on foreign stock exchanges.
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS
One way of visualising the relative risk-return
relationship is to think of fixing the median
"crosshairs" on a conventional risk-return
diagram in the centre of the page and then
watching how a manager moves in relation to
them as the period of analysis is rolled forward
in time.
Three funds with distinctive relative risk-
return performance history have been selected
for discussion.
BHLB Pacific High Growth Fund
With the objective of achieving high capital
gains through investments in companies with
high growth prospects as stated in Chong (1999),
BHLB HGrowth allocated more than 70% (73%
as of 14 April 99) of the total investment in
equity assets.
Fig. 1: The dynamic snail trail diagram
demonstrates the relative 4-quarter return/risk
performance history of BHLB HGrowth. Prior
to 96Q3, BHLB HGrowth was in the "low return
low risk" quadrant. However, the relative
performance of BHLB HGrowth improved
gradually and moved up to the upper left
quadrant, which is the "high return low risk"
quadrant. The snail trail diagram indicated
BHLB HGrowth fund manager has read the
Asian financial crisis right. This outstanding
relative performance exhibits the superior risk-
reduction and value-added skills of BHLB
HGrowth fund manager compared to the peer
group; however the good performance was not
upheld. The performance history exhibits poor
performance in the post-crash period, when the
snail trail descended from the "high return low
risk" quadrant to "low return low risk" quadrant,
and further fell into "low return high risk"
quadrant in 1999.
As a whole, from the snail trail diagram, we
can conclude that the performance of BHLB
HGrowth in pre- and post-crisis period was not
very outstanding (i.e. in the "low risk low return"
quadrant and "low return high risk" quadrant).
But performance history has shown the ability of
the fund manager in lowering the risk as well as
improving returns during the economic crisis
indicating the superior capability of the fund
manager in countering the financial turmoil.
KLMF Regular Saving
Fig. 2. From the snail trail diagram, we can see
that the relative performance history of KLMF R
Saving is not very consistent over time. This is
a very good example of dramatic changes in
performance. In 1996, KLMF R Saving was in
the "low return high risk" quadrant, and later
advanced into the "high return high risk"
quadrant. During the early stage of the financial
crisis, KLMF R Saving was in the "high return
low risk" quadrant. However, the favourable
performance was not maintained very long. After
(98Q1-98Q4), KLMF R Saving performance has
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Fig. 2: Relative risk/return history (KLMF Regular Saving)
been falling, from the "low return low risk"
quadrant to "low return high risk" or the
unfavourable quadrant. This example shows
that the single snapshot approach can be very
misleading especially when the single period
superior performance during the financial crisis
is highlighted and promoted to the public.
As KLMF R Saving's objective is to achieve
long-term capital growth while maintaining a
steady growth in income, it invested heavily in
fixed income securities (56%) and the money
market (20%) compared to other growth funds
in this study. With more than 70% of the total
funds invested in non-equity instruments during
the financial crisis, KLMF R Saving was able to
minimise risk while securing desirable returns
on investment. This might explain the KLMF R
Saving performance history plots being in the
above-median return quadrant with below
average risk during the economic slow down.
The decision of the KLMF R Saving fund
manager to reallocate the assets (from equity to
bond and cash) during the crisis added value to
the fund as well as minimised risk.
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However, during the pre-crisis period, the
performance of KLMF R Saving was below
average. Looking at the trend where the last
point of the snail trail diagram shows a fall from
"low return low risk" quadrant to "low return
high risk" quadrant, might signal unfavourable
future performance. From the dramatic
movement of the KLMF R Saving snail trail, one
should be aware of how dangerous it can be to
neglect the risk dimension or the performance
history of a fund.
MBF Growth Fund
Fig. 3: From the diagram, the performance history
of MBF Growth indicated that MBF Growth is
relatively more risky as the snail trail plots were
moving on the right-region most of the time.
Nevertheless, the relative risk increased
dramatically during the financial crisis. The
relative performance of MBF Growth was
unfavourable (i.e. located in "low return high
risk" quadrant) compared to many other growth
funds studied. However, the relative return has
shown some improvement along with the
regional economy recovery but the relative risk
is still higher than average. The last few plots
of snail trail indicated a recent movement from
the "high return high risk" quadrant to "low
return low risk" quadrant exhibiting a reduction
in return volatility.
As a whole, we can comment that the
performance of MBF Growth is moving in
tandem with aggregate market performance. The
objective of the fund i.e. to achieve growth
through capital appreciation by investing in high
growth companies in Malaysia and Asia Pacific
region, might give us an insight on the high
return volatility and explain the performance of
MBF Growth which is closely affected by the
regional equity market movement.
Overall Performance of 17 Funds
From the appendices, using snail trail analysis,
the most promising unit trusts are Asia Progress
(Appendix 2) and KLMF Growth (Appendix 8).
Both funds have shown improved relative
performance from the "high return high risk"
and "low return low risk" quadrant to "high
return low risk" or the favourable quadrant.
Four unit trusts namely SBB PCapital
(Appendix 18), HUB Growth (Appendix 7), OSK
Equity (Appendix 15) and RHB Capital
(Appendix 17) exhibit concentrated plots around
the median return and risk. The tightness of
their snail trail plots is a direct indication of the
consistency of a fund's risk-return performance.
BBMB Prime (Appendix 3) has been showing a
risk reduction trend
Three funds are classified as below average
as the snail trail diagrams show deteriorating
performance. These funds are BHLB HGrowth
(Appendix 5), KLMF Industry (Appendix 9),
and KLMF AGrowth (10), where the relative
performance has been falling rapidly over recent
High Return Low Risk (HL)
l-'avourable Performance
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Fig. 3: Relative risk/return history (MBF Growth Fund)
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years, from "high return low risk" quadrant to
"low return high risk" quadrant.
Seven other unit trusts did not exhibit any
significant changes in the relative performance
history. Most of these 7 funds remained in the
same quadrant throughout the study period or
moved from/to "high return high risk"(HH)
quadrant to/from "low return low risk"(LL)
quadrant. Moving between these two quadrants
basically is indifferent in terms of risk/return
tradeoffs. These 7 funds are: KLMF Regular
(remained in LL) (Appendix 11); MBf Growth
(maintaied in HH) (Appendix 14); ASM (P)
and ASM FPF (from HH to LL) (Appendix 12 -
13); BHLB Emerging (from HL to HH and LL)
(Appendix 4); BIMB First (from LL to HH)
(Appendix 6); and Pacific Pearl (from LH to
LL) (Appendix 16).
CONCLUSION
From the findings, we discovered that some unit
trusts have undergone quite significant, even
dramatic, changes over the study period. The
traditional risk-return "snapshot" fails to highlight
changing performance and it fails to reveal how
much of that performance is due to the
manager's unique skill and how much is due to
fortuitous market movements enjoyed by most
managers.
Unit trust is a medium to long term
investment instrument. Therefore the initial
selection process of the fund is very important.
Any slight difference in annual returns can turn
into a very big variance at the end of the
investment horizon. For instance, 2% difference
in the annual rate of returns can be magnified
into 21.9% variation in the total returns in 10
years. From the snail trail analysis, we know that
some funds might have more than 30%
difference in their relative annual rates of returns.
Therefore, it is advisable that potential or even
existing unit trust investors be more diligent in
the selection process and might want to include
this snail trail approach as an additional analysis.
For investment purposes, investors should
avoid unit trusts that are consistently staying in
"low return high risk" quadrant. Unit trusts with
very inconsistent snail trail plots over time are
also undesirable because the dramatic movement
indicates very volatile returns, and in the long
term, total holding period returns might deviate
very much from the targeted rate. Unit trusts
located in the "high return low risk" quadrant
are preferred and followed by those located in
"low return low risk" or "high return high risk"
quadrants. Investors with different investment
objectives and risk tolerance level might be
interested in investing in funds located in these
two regions.
Again, the dynamic performance history will
save us from the pit-fall, which we might be
deceived into believing by the exaggerated ux"
period rate of returns as advertised. As a long-
term investor, we should select our investment
vehicle with great caution and not be misled by
the high return figure of any single period.
Instead, consistent long term above average
returns with low risk is most desirable,
REFERENCES
BALZER, L. 1991. Risk/Return: How to learn from
history. Powerful aid to selecting fund
managers. JASSA (12): 19-24.
BANK NEGARA MALAYSIA. Statistical bulletin,
1996 to 2000 editions. Kuala Lumpur:
Percetakan Nasional Malaysia Berhad.
CARHART, M. 1997. Persistence in mutual fund
performance. Journal of Finance- 42(1): 57-82.
CHOONG D. 1999. Investors'Guide to Malaysian Unit
Trusts. Kuala Lumpur: Sage Information
Services.
KENT D., M. GRINBLATT, S. TITMAN and R. WERMERS.
1997. Measuring mutual fund performance
with characteristic-based benchmarks. Journal
of Finance 52(3): 1035-1058.
GRINBLATT M. and S. TITMAN. 1993. Performance
measurement without benchmarks: an
examination of mutual fund returns. Journal of
Business 66(1): 47-68.
. 1994. A study of monthly mutual fund
returns and performance evaluation
techniques. Journal of Financial and Quantitative
Analysis 29(3): 419-444.
OKUNEV, J. 1990. An alternative measure of mutual
fund performance. Journal of Business Finance
and Accounting 17(2): 247-264.
SMIDT, S. 1978. Investment horizons and
performance measurement. Journal of Portfolio
Management 4(2): 18-22.
WOODWARD, R. S. 1983. The peformance of UK
closed-end funds: a comparison of the various
ranking criteria. Journal of Business Finance and
Accounting 10(3): 419-427.
108 Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. 8c Hum. Vol. 8 No. 2 2000
Unit Trust Performance Measurement: the Snail Trail Approach
APPENDIX 1
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
Unit Trust
Asia UT Malaysia Progress Fund
BBMB Prime Fund
BHLB Pacific Emerging Co. Growth Fund
BHLB Pacific High Growth Fund
BIMB UT First Fund
HLB Growth Fund
KLMF Growth Fund
KLMF Industry Fund
KLMF Aggressive Growth Fund
KLMF Regular Saving
MBf Growth Fund
OSK-UOB Equity Trust
Pacific Pearl Fund
RHB Capital Fund
SBB Premium Capital Fund
ASM First Public Fund
ASM Premier Fund
Type of Fund
Growth, Equity
Growth, Equity
Growth, Equity
Growth, Equity
Syariah, Growth, Equity
Growth, Equity
Growth, Equity
Growth, Equity
Growth, Equity
Growth, Equity
Growth, Equity
Growth, Equity
Growth, Equity
Growth, Equity
Growth, Equity
Growth, Equity
Growth, Equity
Units in
Circulation
(million)
1998/99
151
166
384
245
235
253
658
275
310
600
118
248
278
239
304
236
215
Source : Investors* Guide To Malaysian Unit Trusts, 1999.
No. Unit Trust Fund Fund Manager 1998/99
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
Asia UT Malaysia Progress Fund
BBMB Prime Fund
BHLB Emerging Co. Growth Fund
BHLB Pacific High Growth Fund
BIMB UT First Fund
HLB Growth Fund
KLMF Growth Fund
KLMF Industry Fund
KLMF Aggressive Growth Fund
KLMF Regular Saving
MBF Growth Fund
OSK-UOB Equity Trust
Pacific Pearl Fund
RHB Capital Fund
SBB Premium Capital Fund
ASM First Public Fund
ASM Premier Fund
Mushthaq Ahmad Ibrahim
Koh Huat Soon
Lee Chiah Cheang
(external investment advisor)
Lee Chiah Cheang
(external investment advisor)
Abdul Rahim Abu Bakar
Arnold Lim
(external investment advisor)
Edmond Cheah Swee Leng
Edmond Cheah Swee Leng
Chong Chang Choong
Chong Chang Choong
Philip Tan Chek Boon
Lee Seng Young
Chong Sui San
David Lee Chuen Chieh
(external investment advisor)
Pearl Wong
(external investment advisor)
Zalinah A Hamid
Razali Haron
Source: Investors' Guide To Malaysian Unit Trusts, 1999.
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ABSTRAK
Kontrak niagaan ke depan adalah perjanjian antara pembeli dan penjual sesuatu komoditi yang
menetapkan harga, kuantiti dan kualiti komoditi tersebut dan masa bila urus niaga ini akan
berlaku. Aset atau komoditi yang terlibat dalam kontrak niagaan ke depan indeks saham ialah
seratus saham-saham indeks komposit Bursa Saham Kuala Lumpur (BSKL). Salah harga kontrak
boleh berlaku apabila terdapat perbezaan ketara antara harga kontrak niagaan ke depan di
pasaran dengan harga kontrak niagaan ke depan yang sepatutnya atau harga sebenar yang dinilai
dengan menggunakan kaedah "Cost and Carry". Salah harga ini boleh berbentuk harga berlebihan
atau harga berkurangan. Harga kontrak niagaan ke depan berlebihan berlaku apabila harga
pasaran kontrak melebihi harga sebenar dan kos urus niaga. Harga berkurangan berlaku apabila
harga pasaran kontrak niagaan ke depan adalah kurang dari harga sebenar dan kos urus niaga.
Salah harga kontrak niagaan ke depan memberi peluang kepada pelabur untuk meraih keuntungan
dengan memperbetulkan perbezaan antara harga pasaran dan harga sebenar, iaitu dengan
menjual kontrak niagaan ke depan dan membeli saham indeks komposit BSKL apabila berlaku
harga berlebihan dan membeli kontrak niagaan ke depan dan menjual (atau menjual pendek)
saham-saham indeks komposit BSKL apabila berlaku harga berkurangan. Aktiviti pembetulan ini
dikenali juga sebgai aktiviti arbitraj, yang membantu mempertingkatkan kecekapan harga kontrak
niagaan ke depan. Kajian ini menilai peluang arbitraj atas harga harian kontrak bulanan niagaan
ke depan indeks komposit BSKL, atau dikenali sebagai kontrak FKLI bagi jangka masa 1996
hingga 1999. Kecekapan harga kontrak niagaan ke depan dinilai dengan kaedah ralat piawai
antara harga pasaran dengan harga sebenar kontrak niagaan ke depan. Penemuan kajian
menunjukkan adanya berlebihan dan berkurangan harga kontrak niagaan ke depan, tetapi tidak
ada aktiviti arbitraj untuk menyatukan harga sebenar dengan harga pasaran kontrak. Ini
kemungkinan, di antara faktor lain, kerana pelabur tidak boleh menjual pendek saham-saham
indeks komposit BSKL apabila berlakunya berkurangan dalam harga kontrak niagaan ke depan.
Penemuan juga menunjukkan perubahan harga kontrak niagaan ke depan tidaklah berekanada
tetapi berubah mengikut masa yang menyebabkan ada jangka masa yang menunjukkan harga
kontrak berlebihan dan ada jangka masa di mana harga kontrak niagaan ke depan berkurangan,
menepati tahap kecekapan harga kontrak yang berbeza mengikut masa.
ABSTRACT
A futures contract is an agreement between a seller and a buyer that calls for the seller to deliver
to the buyer a specified quantity and grade of an identified commodity, at a fixed time in the
future, and at a price agreed in the contract. Stock index futures contract specify an equity index
as the underlying asset. Arbitrage opportunity exists when the actual futures price deviates from
the fair price by more than transactions costs. This study measures the arbitrage opportunities on
the daily FKLI contracts price from calendar years 1996 through 1999. The pricing efficiency of
the futures contracts was determined by the standard error between the closing actual and
theoretical fair values for each month FKLI futures contract, where the theoretical value was
estimated using the cost-of-carry model. The findings show that the actual futures prices do not
converge towards theoretical prices with the passage of time. Arbitrage opportunities are
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consistently available for traders who have full use of proceeds. One crucial assumption driving
this result is the ability to sell short the cash index (or a subset of stocks in the KLSE CI). The
results also reveal that the stock index futures contract pricing is not monotonic but rather varies
over time with periods of both greater and lesser efficiency.
INTRODUCTION
A futures contract is an agreement between a
seller and a buyer that calls for the seller to
deliver to the buyer a specified quantity and
grade of an identified commodity, at a fixed
time in the future, and at a price agreed in the
contract. All futures contracts are traded on
designated futures exchanges. Futures markets
had their start in agriculture, with the
introduction of commodity futures contracts that
provided fanners, distributors, and processors of
agricultural products to shift the price risk of
their output to speculators. Financial futures
contracts based on financial instruments as the
underlying asset were first introduced in 1972
with the introduction of currency futures traded
on the International Monetary Market. In 1975
the Chicago Board of Trade pioneered trading
in interest rate futures and the stock index
futures were introduced in 1982 on the Kansas
City Board of Trade (KCBT).
Stock index futures contract specify an equity
index as the underlying asset. It is an agreement
between a seller and a buyer to respectively
deliver and take delivery of a basket of shares
that makes up the index, at an agreed price at a
specific future date. However, these contracts
are usually cash-settled avoiding the need to
deliver all the shares that make up the underlying
stock index.
Stock index futures contracts provide
financial executives and money managers' a risk
management tool to reduce potential losses on
a cash position.
Futures provide a more effective and flexible
alternative to adjusting the returns and risk
characteristics of a cash position. For example,
using either betas or portfolio analysis only allows
the investor limited flexibility in changing the
amount of risk in the portfolio. Moreover, betas
and portfolio risk measures change over time. It
also provides speculators a degree of leverage
that typically is not available with other
instruments and allow speculators to change
their risk profiles.
Besides helping to hedge risk and alter the
risk profile of a cash portfolio, stock index futures
contracts also perform the price discovery
function. That is the stock index futures contract
prices reflect the combined views of a large
number of buyers and sellers as to the current
supply/demand situation and the relationship
of prices 12 to 18 months hence. It is an
expression of opinions concerning today's
expectations about the level of market or stock
index performance at some point in the future.
As conditions change, opinions change and
prices of futures contracts also change. The
expected changes in futures prices become
important inputs for market participants in
making effective hedging and speculative
decisions.
Besides the hedging and speculation, stock
index futures can be used for arbitrage activities.
Arbitrage is risk-free and costless activity that
aligns the fair price of a futures contract with
the current price of the contract in the market.
The logic underlying index arbitrage is that the
theoretical futures price should equal that of a
portfolio of stocks composing the index plus the
net cost of carrying the stocks until delivery. If
the futures price exceeds the price of the
portfolio by the net cost of carry, it would be
profitable for the arbitrager to buy the index
portfolio and sell futures against it. If the futures
price were less than the price of portfolio and
the costs, it would be profitable for the arbitrager
to buy the futures contract and sell the index
portfolio. Such actions force the futures price
back toward the fair price. The buying of the
futures contracts is usually done in anticipation
of share price increase and selling in anticipation
of share price decrease. However, expectations
can be wrong, and if expectations are wrong
then the selling of the underlying shares (in
case of buying the futures contracts when they
are undervalued) and buying the underlying
shares (when the futures contracts are sold when
they are overvalued) will generate some gains to
buffer losses. Without arbitrage, the futures price
could deviate significantly from the fair price,
causing hedgers to avoid using futures markets
because of poor hedging results and the
uncertainty of the pricing process.
The pricing of futures contracts and
arbitrage between futures and cash are closely
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related concepts. The fair price of a futures
contract is determined by a pricing model that
incorporates the value of the underlying cash
asset, the time to expiration of the futures
contract, the cost of financing the cash position,
the cash inflows of the asset, and any special
characteristics of the futures contract at
expiration. In perfect markets - that is, when
transactions costs and tax effects are not relevant
- the actual futures price equals the fair price.
Real futures markets are not perfect and there
will always be opportunities to arbitrage the
differences in the fair and actual prices of futures
contracts and in the process aligning these prices,
while earning arbitrage profits. The research
issue addressed in this paper is whether arbitrage
opportunities exists on the FKLI contracts and
whether the futures market is price efficient
over time.
THE MALAYSIAN STOCK INDEX
FUTURES CONTRACTS
In Malaysia, the stock index futures contracts
were introduced on the Kuala Lumpur Options
& Financial Futures Exchange ("KLOFFE") on
15 December 1995. Since June 2001, KLOFFE is
abserved under the MDEX a Malaysian
Derivatives Market. The contracts also recognized
that FKLI futures contract are based on the 100
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Composite Index
(KLSE CI) stocks. Contract specifications of the
FKLI futures call for delivery of a basket of
shares, which makes up the KLSE CI. However,
the contracts are always cash-settled. Cash
settlement means that at the time of delivery,
the seller of the futures contract does not have
to deliver to the buyer the 100 KLSE CI shares,
but rather will exchange cash equal to the
difference between the price of the index in the
futures contract and the price of the underlying
index at the time of delivery. The underlying
cash "value1* of the contract is determined by
multiplying the Index by value 100. The
minimum change (tick) in the Index is 0.1,
which is worth RM10. A change of one index
point is worth RM100 (that is 100 xl.0).
OBJECTIVE
Futures contracts traded on the KLOFFE should
reflect the actual worth of the asset in a future
period. Theoretically, the futures price should
equal the cash price of the asset (KLSE CI) plus
the transaction costs. Arbitrage exists when the
actual Tutu res price deviates from the fair price
by more than transactions costs. When sufficiently
large profits above the risk-free return exist,
arbitragers step in and buy the lower-priced
security (the cash asset) and sell the higher
priced security (the futures contract). Such
actions force the futures price back toward the
fair price. Profits are realised by unwinding the
positions when the prices of the securities get
properly aligned. Without arbitrage, the futures
price could deviate significantly from the fair
price, causing hedgers to avoid using futures
markets because of poor hedging results and the
uncertainty of the pricing process. This study
measures the arbitrage opportunities on the daily
FKLI contracts price from calendar years 1996
through 1999. To test the pricing efficiency of
the futures contracts, the standard error between
the closing actual and theoretical fair values for
each month FKLI futures contract for the same
period. The measurement period for each
contract was the 18-22 tracking days when the
contract was the spot month. The spot month
contract has, so far, been the most liquid, making
this period the most appropriate for measuring
market efficiency. If the FKLI futures market
becomes more price efficient, the standard errors
should decline over time, implying lesser
opportunities for arbitrage.
MODEL SPECIFICATION
The cost of carry model explains the relationship
between the cash asset price and futures price. It
shows the relationship created between these
markets when an arbitrager buys the cash asset
now, holds and finances the asset with borrowed
funds for the life of the futures contract, and
then delivers the cash asset into the futures
contract when the futures expire. The fair futures
price calculated by the cost of carry model for
stock index futures must consider the dividends
received from holding the stocks in the index
that is,
1
 FAIR (1)
where
PFAIR = the fair futures price for a stock index
Pc = the current value of the underlying cash
stock index
i = the financing rate of interest or
equivalent investment return desired
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D = the Ringgit dividend amount in index
points received on the stocks in the
index from now until the expiration of
the futures contract
t = number of days until expiration of the
futures divided by 365
Equation (1) illustrates both the relationship
between the futures and current cash values and
the net difference between the financing (or
opportunity) costs and the income received.
The Ringgit dividend, D, must be
recalculated whenever a stock in the index pays
its dividend or a firm alters its dividend. The
model shows that the effect of receiving dividends
over the life of the futures contract is to lower
the futures price. This relationship occurs
because (a) the dividends received reduce the
net funds needed to finance the cash position
and (b) a purchase of the futures contract is an
alternative to holding the cash stocks, but a long
position in futures does not provide any income
from dividend payments.
The continuous time equivalent to the above
cost of carry equation is used frequently, since
only the dividend yield rather than the frequency
changing total Ringgit dividends are needed for
its calculation:
FAIR
C (2)
where d = the dividend yield on the stock index
If one has only the dividend yield, then an
alternative to using Equation (2) is to convert
the yield to Ringgit dividends, as shown in
Equation (3)
D = d P c t (3)
Note that Equation (1) provides the most
accurate calculation of the effects of dividends
and therefore is employed in many of the
arbitrage computer models.
Equations (1) and (2) and Example 1
illustrate both the relationship between the
futures and current cash index values and the
net difference between the financing costs and
the dividend income received. In particular, the
larger the difference between i and d, the larger
the price difference between PFAIR and Pc. In
addition, the larger the value oft, the larger the
price difference between the futures and cash
index values.
Example 1 also illustrates that Equations (1)
and (2) used for determining the fair futures
price, PFAIR can provide slightly different values.
Which equation the trader employs depends on
the trader's beliefs concerning which equation
best describes the cash flow process.
When the actual stock index futures price
differs from the cost of carry forward price by
more than transactions costs, arbitrage
opportunity is created. Equation (1) can be
expressed to include transactions costs to define
the arbitrage opportunities for stock index
futures:
Pc (1 + i)1 - D + T < PF < Pc d+i)
or more compactly as
P + T < P < P - T
rFAIR T X ^ r F ^ rFAIR A
- D - T
(4)
(5)
with T being the total transactions costs.
DATA
The data on the closing FKLI futures contracts
prices was obtained from KLOFFE. The closing
KLSE CI values and 90-days Malaysian T-bills
rate were obtained from Bank Negara Malaysia.
The dividend yield values for the KLSE CI was
obtained from the Investor's Digest. The risk-free
rate was the yield of the 3-months Treasury Bills
security maturing nearest to the expiration date
of each contract. The data was collected for a 4-
year period from February 1996 to December
1999.
FINDINGS
The fair value of futures prices is calculated
using a cost-of-carry model (Equation 1), The
extent of deviation of the market price of futures
contract (FKLI) from their fair values is defined
as a percentage of futures market premium over
futures fair values, n, as,
* =
 l n
 ( p F / pFAIR)
where,
n is the percentage premium of the FKLI
price over fair value
PF is the FKLI price and
PFAIR is the FKLI fair value as implied from the
KLSE CI price
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EXAMPLE-1 : Determining the Fair Value of a Stock Index Futures Contract
The following values represent actual stock market values:
KLSE CI 319.72
3-months T-bill yield 6.59%
Dividend yield on the Index stocks 3.02%
Days until expiration of the futures 84
Using these data, the fair price is calculated as follows:
rCiiD *• r e
e(0.065«).0302)(84/365)
= 319.72 e00082159
= 322.36
Equation (1) can also be used to calculate the fair price if the dividend yield first is converted to total Ringgit
dividends (or if the total Ringgit dividends expected over the life of the futures contract are added up separately
for the individual stocks). Equation (3) is employed to convert dividend yields to dollar dividends:
D = d Pc t
D = (0.0302) (319.72) (84/365) = 2.222
Then one is able to calculate the fair price as follows:
P c d + i ) l - D
319.72 (
322.23
0.0659)84/565 - 2.222
Notice that the two calculated values for the fair futures price differ slightly. There are two reasons for this. Most
important, Equation (1) calculates the dividend value in index points, whereas Equation (2) uses the dividend
yield. Moreover, the first formulation uses discrete compounding, whereas the second employs continuous
compounding.
Fig. 1: Plots of future premium over the period
Fig. 1 plots the percent of mispricing of each
contract on a daily basis. This percent is the
difference between the actual and theoretical
price expressed as a percent of the theoretical
price. The plot shows considerable deviation of
FKLI prices from fair value during the crisis
period, from September 1997 onwards. The
September 1997 contract was undervalued by as
much as 7.86% at the beginning of the financial
crisis. By contrast, the September 1998 contract
was overpriced by 18.67% and this was the month
when Malaysia implemented the capital and
exchange controls. Overall, the 1996 contracts
traded approximately at fair value compared to
contracts in the later years (September 1997
onwards).
Fig. 2 shows the distribution of the futures
premium, p over the fair value. The frequency
of distribution is positively skewed indicating
more numerous positive and persistent premiums
compared to negative premium. This means, on
average, the futures contracts are overpriced,
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Fig. 2: Distribution of the FKU premium over fair value
that is market price of futures contracts is higher
than their fair price.
Table 1 shows that the FKLI futures for year
1996 and 1997 were undervalued by 0.14% and
0.42% respectively. Ignoring transaction costs,
there were a long futures arbitrage opportunities
in both years. Profits from long futures arbitrage
is generated when the actual futures price is less
than the fair price plus transactions cost which is
usually a constant for stock index futures
contracts. The way to implement the arbitrage is
to buy the undervalued futures and sell the
KLSE CI shares (assuming that short selling of
shares is allowed).
TABLE 1
Average monthly FKLI premium over fair value
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
AVERAGE
1996
0.54
-0.02
-0.3
-0.18
-0.65
-0.3
-0.82
-0.33
0.21
0.27
0.09
-0.14
1997
0.02
0.04
0.19
-0.37
-0.85
0.14
-0.37
-0.39
-3.21
-1.54
0.16
1.09
-0.42
1998
0.09
-0.31
0.37
-2.21
-1.55
0.48
1.55
1.67
4.06
3.98
3.09
3.37
1.22
1999
3.36
2.09
1.24
2.6
1.72
2.01
3.02
1.76
1.26
1.21
2.22
2.04
2.04
For the year 1998 and 1999, the FKLI futures
were overvalued by 1.22% and 2.04% respectively.
Since the actual futures price is greater than the
fair price, selling the higher-priced futures
contract and purchasing shares of the KLSE CI
index generates an arbitrage profit. This
represents a short futures arbitrage opportunity.
To test the pricing efficiency of the futures
contracts or in other words the gradual
convergence of the market price to the fair
price of futures contracts, the standard error
between the closing actual and theoretical fair
values for each month FKLI futures contract was
estimated and the results are summarized in
Table 2. If the FKLI futures market is getting
more efficient, then there should be a narrowing
of the difference in the market and fair price of
futures contract (also indication of active
arbitrage activity) indicated by declining values
of standard errors over time. Fig. 3 plots the
monthly standard errors between the closing
actual and theoretical fair value of futures
contracts.
TABLE 2
Standard errors of the actual closing and
theoretical fair value
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
AVERAGE
1996
1.30
0.09
0.21
0.27
0.58
0.21
0.98
0.39
0.16
0,22
0.37
0.44
1997
0.15
0.15
0.19
0.32
1.20
0.65
0.57
2.35
16.86
5.57
2.35
4.52
2.91
1998
2.54
1.33
1.40
8.92
5.19
1.53
6.42
5.12
41.34
24.08
13.19
17.54
10.72
1999
19.06
8.21
4.77
9.29
8.42
5.80
17.60
4.88
3.20
2.52
6.09
5.87
7.97
Table 2 and Fig. 3 show that the standard
errors are not declining but rather increasing
over the period of analysis suggesting that the
pricing efficiency of FKLI futures contract has
declined over time. This also implies lack of
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active arbitrage activity to correct the differences
between actual and fair price of futures contracts.
This also implies that the futures market creates
more opportunities for speculating rather than
hedging; as it is difficult for hedgers to use the
inefficiently priced futures contract to cover their
price risk.
A regression analysis between the theoretical
and actual value of futures contracts confirms a
positive and significant relationship with 99.78%
of the variation in the theoretical value explained
by the changes in the actual value of the futures
contract.
Details of the regression analysis are
summarized in Table 3. The positive relationship
is vital for hedgers to construct an effective
hedge to cover the price risk on their cash
portfolio.
TABLE 3
Relationship between actual and fair prices
Mean,
Mean,
a
b
r
R2
t
n
PF
FAIR
825.6531
822.0683
-14.4293
1.0131
0.9989
0.9978
661.9527
965
CONCLUSION
Arbitrage activity on the stock index futures
contracts links the cash stock market to the
stock index futures market. Arbitrages ensure
that futures market values do not diverge too
much from fair values, and arbitrage profits are
created if the divergence exceeds the costs of
transactions. This implies a predictable positive
relationship between cash and futures prices,
which is vital to hedgers to hedge the price risk
of their cash portfolios using stock index futures.
This study provides some preliminary
evidence of the efficiency of the FKLI stock
index futures based on the simple "costof-carry"
model. The findings suggest that the actual
futures prices do not converge towards
theoretical prices with the passage of time. This
pricing inefficiency might be due to the infancy
of FKLI futures market and immaturity of the
arbitrage activity in aligning the cash and futures
markets. This implies that arbitrage opportunities
are consistently available (though do not seem
to be taken up) for traders who have full use of
proceeds. One crucial assumption driving this
result is the ability to sell short the cash index
(or a subset of stocks in the KLSE CI). The
results also reveal that the stock index pricing is
not monotonic but rather varies over time with
periods of both greater and lesser efficiency.
Arbitrage opportunities exists when risk-free
profits are possible, which occurs when the
futures and market prices deviate by more than
transactions costs. Usually in developed markets,
arbitrage opportunities are available to insiders
and are quickly exploited thereby increasing the
pricing efficiency of futures markets. Therefore,
stock index arbitrage is a self-regulating
mechanism that increases the price efficiency of
the futures markets. However, the findings of
this study show a continuous inefficiency of the
futures market and thereby existence of arbitrage
opportunities for traders. This implies that our
futures market requires greater liquidity to enable
arbitragers to correct any mispricing and
consequently increase price efficiency of futures
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contracts. An inefficient futures market will
deter away hedgers as they would not be able to
effectively hedge away the price risk and
consequently further decreased the liquidity of
the market. One sure way to increase liquidity is
to reduce transactions costs and increase
participation of both domestic and foreign
institutional investors.
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